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ZONING FOR DOLLARS: NEW RULES
FOR AN OLD GAME? COMMENTS ON
THE MUNICIPAL AR T SOCIETY
AND NOLLAN CASES
Jerold S. Kayden *
Faced with mounting social needs and continuing fiscal constraints,
more and more cities "mint" money through their zoning codes to fi-
nance a wide array of public amenities. Through the land use regula-
tory technique formally known as "incentive zoning," cities grant
private real estate developers the legal right to disregard zoning restric-
tions in return for their voluntary agreement to provide urban design
features such as plazas, atriums, and parks, and social facilities and
services such as affordable housing, day care centers, and job training.
Since its inception some thirty years ago,' incentive zoning has enjoyed
broad support from developers and their attorneys, avoiding the legal
challenges commonly brought against land use regulations requiring
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1. New York City's 1961 zoning resolution, a massive rewrite of the city's (and the
country's) first zoning ordinance of 1916, introduced the incentive zoning concept. See
J. GETZELS & M. JAFFE, ZONING BONUSES IN CENTRAL CITIES 1 (Planning Advisory
Service Report No. 410, 1988); Barnett, Introduction to Part III: Case Studies in Crea-
tive Urban Zoning, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC
CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 127 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970) [hereinafter THE
NEW ZONING].
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the provision of public amenities.2
In an unlikely convergence of timing, topic, and result, two 1987
judicial decisions, one from a state trial court, the other from the
United States Supreme Court, have fixed an ominous cloud over cer-
tain applications of incentive zoning. In Municipal Art Society v. City
of New York,3 a New York trial judge invalidated the sale of city-
owned land to a private developer, on the basis that the incentive zon-
ing component of the deal constituted improper zoning for sale. In
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,4 the Court struck down a
state agency's request to a private landowner for a public easement,
using reasoning that appears to apply to incentive zoning. On the sur-
face, the decisions differ in many respects. One involves the high-flying
world of Manhattan real estate development and an express incentive
zoning ordinance. The other concerns a couple desiring to build a
home on the California coast and does not even mention the words
"incentive zoning." Nonetheless, both decisions pose the same troub-
ling question to advocates of the technique's recent efforts to encourage
private provision of social facilities and services: what is the relation-
ship between the government-offered incentive and the developer-
provided amenity? Not surprisingly, the cases suggest that the more
tenuous the relationship, the more suspect the exercise.
This article explores the extent to which these decisions undermine
incentive zoning. First, the article canvasses the empirical record of
incentive zoning. Next, the article critiques the analyses of the two
decisions insofar as they apply to the technique. Moreover, the article
argues that statutory and constitutional analysis of exercises of incen-
tive zoning for "unrelated amenities"5 should not differ from that ac-
corded incentive zoning for "related amenities." Finally, the article
concludes that ameliorative public policies should address the legiti-
mate concerns raised by the "unrelated amenities" question.
2. Indeed, only one law review article devotes itself exclusively to legal issues
presented by incentive zoning. See Benson, Bonus or Incentive Zoning - Legal Impli-
cations, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 895 (1970).
3. 137 Misc. 2d 832, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
4. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
5. For purposes of this article, the phrase "unrelated amenities" refers to a category
of amenities described infra text accompanying notes 15-17. The phrase is not meant to
prejudge whether the amenities are unrelated in the legal sense of the word.
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I. EMPIRICAL RECORD OF INCENTIVE ZONING
Many large and medium size cities throughout the United States em-
ploy incentive zoning.6 New York City pioneered its use in 1961, al-
lowing construction of ten square feet of additional office space in
exchange for each square foot of plaza, and three bonus office square
feet in exchange for each square foot of arcade.7 New York's list of
bonusable amenities expanded during the 1960s and 1970s to include
through-block arcades, covered pedestrian spaces, elevated walkways,
and theatres.' Developers responded favorably to the city's entice-
ments. More than two-thirds of all major office buildings constructed
between 1963 and 1975 received zoning bonuses.9 Statistics compiled
for that twelve-year period indicate that the city granted more than 12
million square feet of bonus office space to ninety-one buildings.10
Other cities tailored incentive zoning to fit their specific environ-
ments. San Francisco, California, for example, offered zoning bonuses
to encourage developers to provide rooftop observatories for tourists.11
Anchorage, Alaska provided incentives for climate-controlled plazas
and courtyards.12 Miami, Florida developed incentives to encourage
retail activity at street level.1 3 Cincinnati, Ohio granted incentives for
historic preservation of important structures.1 4
While cities used incentive zoning during the 1960s and 1970s prin-
cipally to stimulate construction of "urban design" amenities such as
plazas and arcades, more recent applications of the technique en-
6. See J. GETzELS & M. JAFFE, supra note 1, at 1-8. Cities frequently obtain public
amenities through informal negotiations with developers, without the existence or au-
thority of formally enacted incentive zoning. Although this article focuses on formally
enacted incentive zoning, its analysis applies to informal negotiations as well.
7. See J. KAYDEN, INCENTIVE ZONING IN NEw YORK CITY: A COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 10 (Policy Analysis Series No. 201, 1978). Although floor area (density)
bonuses remain the dominant incentive today, cities have employed other incentives to
encourage provision of amenities, such as height limitation waivers and parking ratio
reductions. This article refers to floor area (density) bonuses when discussing
incentives.
8. Id. at 10-14.
9. Id. at 11.
10. Id. at 11, 23.
11. See Svirsky, San Francisco: The Downtown Development Bonus System, in THE
NEW ZONING, supra note 1, at 145.
12. See R. CooK, ZONING FOR DowNTowN URBAN DESIGN 109 (1980).
13. See J. GETZELS & M. JAFFE, supra note I, at 6.
14. Id. at 8.
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courage "social" amenities such as low-income housing, day care cen-
ters, cultural facilities, and job training. Newton, Massachusetts allows
larger residential apartment complexes than otherwise permissible in
order to obtain low and moderate-income housing.15 Seattle, Washing-
ton offers floor area bonuses to office developers who provide day care
facilities and affordable housing. 16 Hartford, Connecticut gives bo-
nuses to encourage job training and the provision of visual and per-
forming arts spaces. 17
As individuals have begun to understand better the connection be-
tween land use regulations and the quality of local physical environ-
ments, criticism of incentive zoning has increased. 18 Where zoning
administration was once left to planning-oriented professionals, 19 zon-
ing today excites neighborhood activists, political leaders, and newspa-
per reporters. Government approval of new development routinely
triggers complaints that streets and sidewalks are already too con-
gested, that neighborhoods have lost their human scale, and that indis-
pensable open space is disappearing. Because incentive zoning
definitionally tampers with baseline zoning rules by allowing develop-
ers to construct buildings larger than otherwise permitted, the tech-
nique has become a lightning rod for general discontent with local land
use policies.2 °
The central criticism alleges that incentive zoning corrupts orthodox
planning and zoning models by persuading planners to greenlight
15. See Iodice v. City of Newton, 397 Mass. 329, 491 N.E.2d 618 (1986).
16. See Lassar, Seattle's Zoning Saga, URB. LAND, Sept. 1988, at 34.
17. See J. GETZELS & M. JAFFE, supra note 1, at 8-9.
18. Noted urban observer William H. Whyte has written the most pungent attacks
against incentive zoning. See W. WHYrE, CrrY 229-55 (1988); Whyte, What Price
Sunlight.- Designing a Livable Midtown, NEW YORK, Mar. 9, 1981, at 24-30.
19. See, e.g., Randle, Professors, Reformers, Bureaucrats, and Cronies: The Players
in "Euclid v. Ambler", in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL To
KEEP 43-47 (C. Haar & J. Kayden eds. 1989).
20. In the early 1980s, two of incentive zoning's most fervent practitioners, New
York City and San Francisco, significantly reduced their reliance on the technique, in
part because of its inherent bias toward additional development to provide desired
amenities. See, eg., Dep't of City Planning, City of New York, Midtown Development
12 (June 1981). In contrast, economically depressed cities anxious to stimulate job crea-
tion and local tax revenues usually view any development whatsoever as an asset. Cf.
Kayden, Planning Gain: Developer Provision of Public Benefits in Britain, in PRIVATE
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES 164 (R. Alterman ed. 1988) (quoting planning agency
official from economically depressed northern England, "Getting the developer to build
anything is, in our eyes, [an amenity]."). For such cities, incentive zoning is a luxury
they cannot afford.
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otherwise undesirable projects solely to obtain the privately financed
amenities.2 ' Zoning expresses conclusions about theoretically objective
physical planning criteria such as street, sidewalk, sewer, and water
pipe capacity; light and air availability at ground level; and compatibil-
ity of new buildings with the existing neighborhood. Thus, any over-
riding of that zoning, no matter what the proposed amenity,
intrinsically delegitimizes the entire regulatory system. This critique
gains particular currency when the amenity is geographically or con-
ceptually unrelated to the development project obtaining the incentive.
For example, while the community-at-large benefits from the provision
of affordable housing or an arts center, the neighborhood immediately
surrounding the bonused project suffers from greater congestion and
loss of light and air attributable to the bonus office space. Good physi-
cal planning, underpinned by objective criteria, is sacrificed on the altar
of unrelated amenities. Consequently, one set of city residents or em-
ployees unfairly suffers for the benefit of all.
Additionally troubling to some is incentive zoning's inherent depen-
dence on a philosophy of sanctioned bribery, abiding a private sector
that can "buy" its way out of legal restrictions. If the public amenities
are so important, goes the argument, then government should require
developers to provide them without a zoning payoff, or alternatively,
should finance them from tax revenues.2 2
In defense of incentive zoning, it first must be observed that physical
planning objectives arguably undermined by the technique are not the
only interests important to communities. Other values, including those
represented by social amenities, contribute to the quality of life. For
example, a city might resolve that it will tolerate taller buildings and
greater congestion in return for more low-income housing and day care
facilities. Furthermore, most land use regulatory decisions, not just
incentive zoning transactions, pose difficult tradeoffs between neighbor-
hood and citywide concerns. The placement of a drug treatment center
in one neighborhood, for example, will disproportionately burden that
neighborhood for the good of the whole city. Similarly, the zoning of
one district for one class of use may adversely affect property values in
that area relative to other areas. Moreover, the sanctioned bribery crit-
21. See J. GETZELS & M. JAFFE, supra note 1, at 12.
22. Still other criticisms focus on the inferior design quality of amenities that actu-
ally have been provided, see W. WHYTE, supra note 18, at 234, and the excessive finan-
cial value of incentives actually awarded to developers in relation to the financial cost of
amenities. See J. KAYDEN, supra note 7, at 59-65.
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icism could apply to any government program of inducement to the
private sector, not just incentive zoning.2 3 Finally, the technique en-
joys a superior track record for creating amenities which otherwise
might not exist.24
II. THE MUNICIPAL ART SOCIETY CASE
The policy debate embroiling incentive zoning recently has taken a
back seat to the legal debate. In Municipal Art Society v. City of New
York,25 a state trial judge delivered a blow against what he considered
a violation of fundamental principle: the sale of zoning for general rev-
enue purposes by a municipality. The opinion would appear to outlaw
the practice of incentive zoning for unrelated amenities. To evaluate
the court's legal reasoning, and to draw conclusions about its ultimate
impact, a thorough understanding of the facts is essential.
Prominently situated at the southwest corner of Central Park in
midtown Manhattan, Columbus Circle is a tangled web of streets,
buildings, and monuments. Through exercise of its eminent domain
authority in 1953, New York City acquired a two-block parcel of land,
between 58th and 60th Streets immediately to the west of Columbus
Circle, for construction of a convention center.2 6 The Triborough
Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA), a state-created agency, took
control of the project and built the New York Coliseum, home to
countless auto shows and similar programs during the 1960s and
1970s.27
With completion of a new and larger convention center scheduled
for 1986, the old Coliseum became surplus public property which the
city and the TBTA jointly elected to sell to a private developer for
redevelopment.2" Acting as lead agency for the sale, the TBTA, in
23. Bribery implies a secretive back-door deal. In contrast, formal incentive zoning
generally operates in the sunlight, with a formal process and record open to public
scrutiny.
24. Contrary to the claims of some critics, see, &g., W. WHYTE, supra note 18, at
229-55, the empirical record of incentive zoning is not all bad. See, eg., Haar &
Kayden, Zoning, After 70 Years, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1986, at A19, col. 2.
25. 137 Misc. 2d 832, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
26. Id. at 833, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 801. The facts are drawn principally from Munici-
pal Art Society.
27. Id. The TBTA also constructed an office building on the site.
28. Id. at 833-34, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 801. Designed by architect I. M. Pei, the new
convention center was named after the late Senator Jacob Javits of New York and
opened in 1986.
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February, 1985, issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) announcing cri-
teria governing the sale.2 9 The RFP stated, inter alia, that the amount
offered for the property would be the "primary consideration," and
that other considerations would include "the economic viability of the
proposal, the developer's experience and financial capacity, [and] the
overall benefit to the City."3 Such criteria are typical of public land
disposition RFPs issued by cities across the country.
3 1
The Coliseum RFP also enumerated special criteria regarding the
use of incentive zoning that, in the trial judge's eyes, fatally tainted the
sale. Under the existing zoning governing the site, a developer could
build at a base matter of right density of fifteen Floor Area Ratio
(FAR), meaning that buildings could contain a maximum number of
square feet equivalent to fifteen times the square feet of the site itself.32
A 1982 zoning amendment affecting midtown Manhattan, including
the Coliseum parcel, authorized the City Planning Commission, in its
discretion, to award developers a floor area bonus up to twenty percent
above the base fifteen FAR, or an additional three FAR, if the devel-
oper agreed to provide "major improvements for adjacent subway sta-
tions."'3 3 "Adjacency" meant that "the zoning lot for the development
... on which a floor area bonus is requested" be "adjacent to the mez-
zanine or concourse of the subway station for which the improvement
is proposed or an existing connecting passageway to the station.",34
Under detailed procedures outlined in the zoning amendment, develop-
ers would apply to the City Planning Commission for the bonus, which
the city would grant by special permit after public notice and hearing
and subject to Board of Estimate action.35
29. Id. at 834, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
30. Id.
31. See Gruen, Public/Private Projects, URB. LAND, Aug. 1986, at 2.
32. Municipal Art Soc'y, 137 Misc. 2d at 833, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 801. At a 15 FAR,
without regard to other dimensional restrictions in the zoning ordinance, a building
covering the entire site would rise 15 stories, a building covering half the site would rise
30 stories, and so forth.
33. Id. (quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK § 81-53 (1982)). The 1982 incentive zoning amendments were part of a package
of zoning changes designed to discourage development on the east side and encourage
development on the west side of Manhattan. See New York City Planning Commission,
MIDTOWN ZONING, Mar. 1982, at 20.
34. Municipal Art Soc'y, 137 Misc. 2d at 833, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 801 (quoting NEW
YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 81-53 (1982)).
35. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
§ 81-53 (1982). The improvements must comply with design standards announced in
1991]
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The RFP announced that the selected developer would be required
to "apply for and use its best efforts to obtain the maximum twenty
percent Subway Bonus," calculated to be 448,500 square feet, in return
for improvements expressly described in the RFP to the 59th Street
subway station located adjacent to the Coliseum.36 The RFP further
instructed bidding developers to "assume the maximum twenty percent
FAR Subway Bonus [would] be granted."37 In case the City Planning
Commission granted a portion, but not all, of the bonus, the developer
would remain obligated to provide all promised subway station im-
provements, but the site's purchase price would be reduced according
to a specified formula.38 Under this formula, the maximum purchase
price reduction forthcoming if no bonus was granted amounted to $57
million.39 In that event, the city and TBTA would enjoy the right to
cancel the entire deal with the developer."
Following review of the fifteen development proposals submitted by
the New York City Transit Authority's "Station Planning Guidelines," id. § 81-533,
and applicants must submit schematic or concept plans to the Metropolitan Transporta-
tion Authority, the Transit Authority, and the City Planning Commission. Id. § 81-
534(a). The ordinance required that "[t]he special permit application to the Planning
Commission shall include information and justification sufficient to provide the Com-
mission with a basis for evaluating the benefits to the City from the proposed improve-
ment and determining the appropriate amount of bonusfloor area.... ." Id. § 81-534(c)
(emphasis in original). To determine how much bonus floor area would be awarded, the
ordinance stated:
The amount of thefloor area bonus shall be in the discretion of the City Planning
Commission and may range from no bonus floor area to the maximum amount
allowable by special permit.... In determining the precise amount of floor area
bonus, the Commission shall make findings on the following:
(a) the degree to which the station's general accessibility, rider orientation and
safety will be improved by the provision of new connections, additions to circula-
tion space or easing of circulation bottlenecks;
(b) improvements in the station's environment by provision of daylight access, bet-
ter orientation of riders, or improvements to noise control, air quality, lighting or
other architectural treatments;
(c) provision of escalators where justified by traffic or depth of mezzanine or plat-
form below street level;
(d) convenience and spaciousness of street level entrance and compatible relation-
ship to the development's or the enlargement's ground floor uses.
Id. § 81-535 (emphasis in original).
36. Municipal Art Soc'y, 137 Misc. 2d at 834, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 801 (quoting the
RFP).
37. Id. (quoting the RFP).
38. Id. (quoting the RFP).
39. Id. (quoting the RFP).
40. Id. (quoting the RFP).
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the May, 1985 deadline, a joint committee of city and Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA) officials chose a bid of $455,100,000
from Boston Properties, a real estate company headed by developer
Mort Zuckerman. 41 Boston Properties proposed a mixed-use develop-
ment anchored by a headquarters office building for the investment
banking firm of Salomon Brothers,42 with additional office space,
apartments, movie theatres, retail stores, and a parking garage.43 Ar-
chitect Moshe Safdie's design proposed a sixty-eight story tower and a
fifty-eight story tower, with a total floor area of 2,689,569 square feet
including the three FAR 448,500 square foot bonus.' In September,
1985, the parties signed a contract of sale which, in compliance with
the RFP, included a provision stating that the $455 million purchase
price would be reduced by up to $57 million if the developer was un-
able to secure the subway bonus.45 Boston Properties subsequently ap-
plied for and obtained from the City Planning Commission in
December, 1986, a special permit awarding the maximum subway floor
area bonus.46 By this time, the original cost estimate of $20-$25 mil-
lion for the subway improvements had risen to $35-$40 million.4 7 The
entire Coliseum project won approval from the TBTA and the city's
Board of Estimate in February, 1987.48
Several additional agreements pertained to disposition of the sale
41. Id. The committee rejected a $477 million bid from a competing developer,
because that developer had not found a prime commercial tenant for the project. Id.
See Taylor, The Shadow: The Uproar Over the Big Coliseum Project, NEW YORK, Oct.
5, 1987, at 40, 46. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority is the parent agency of
the TBTA.
42. Salomon Brothers subsequently withdrew from the project after the stock mar-
ket's notorious "Black Monday" crash of October 19, 1987. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
1987, at 31, col. 1.
43. Municipal Art Soc'y, 137 Misc. 2d at 834, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 801-02.
44. See id. at 834, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 802; see also Application for a Zoning Bonus
(Nov. 19, 1986), reprinted in 2 Respondent-Appellants' Appendix, at A584, A586, Mu-
nicipal Art Soc'y v. City of New York, 137 Misc. 2d 832, 522 N.Y.S. 2d 800 (Sup. Ct.
1987) (No. 13443-87); Resolution of City Planning Commission Regarding Application
for Grant of Special Permit for Floor Area Bonus, (Dec. 19, 1986), reprinted in 2 Re-
spondent-Appellants' Appendix, at A494, Municipal Art Soc'y v. City of New York,
137 Misc.2d 832, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1987); infra note 69.
45. Municipal Art Soc'y, 137 Misc. 2d at 834-35, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 801-02.
46. Id. at 835, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
47. Id.
48. Id. In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that the city's Board of Estimate violated
the "one person one vote" principle. See Board of Estimate v. Morris, 485 U.S. 986
(1989). Following that decision, the city adopted a new charter eliminating the old
1991]
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revenues. Under an early agreement signed in December, 1984, the
city and TBTA determined to share the sale's net proceeds equally.4 9
The TBTA would "spend its proceeds solely for MTA capital projects
in the City of New York," while the city would "spend its proceeds
over a five year period solely for [Transit Authority] capital
projects." 50 At the time of the sale's final approval, however, the city,
MTA, and TBTA altered their understanding as to how proceeds
would be spent.51 The half of net proceeds originally earmarked for
MTA capital projects would be spent instead for Transit Authority op-
erating purposes, satisfying the city's existing statutory obligation to
fund such operations. 2
The Municipal Art Society of New York, a well-established non-
profit organization interested in city design and historic preservation
issues, filed suit on June 4, 1987 to invalidate the sale. 3 The Society
alleged, inter alia, that the city illegally sold a zoning bonus. 4 Behind
the legal allegations lay one overriding substantive objection: the pro-
ject was too big. The shadow it would cast over neighboring Central
Park quickly became a symbolic rallying point against what many con-
sidered to be development out of control.55
A. The State Court's Analysis
For state supreme court Justice Edward H. Lehner, the deal's ruin-
ous flaw, what he characterized as "a 'cash sale' of a zoning bonus,"5 6
revolved around the $57 million contingent adjustment to the sales
price as described in the RFP and sales agreement. 7 Under Justice
Board of Estimate and redistributing its authority for land use decisions to an expanded
city council. See Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1989, at B4A, col. 2.
49. Municipal Art Soc'y, 137 Misc. 2d at 834, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
50. Id. The city obligated itself to spend the proceeds at a rate of 28% in the first
year, and 18% in each of the next four years. Id.
51. Id. at 835, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
52. Id.
53. Other plaintiffs in the suit were individuals.
54. Additional claims related to the applicability of the State Environmental Qual-
ity Review Act. Id. at 835-36, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 802. The trial court found it unneces-
sary to reach such claims. Id. at 838, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
55. See Taylor, supra note 41 (cover of magazine).
56. Municipal Art Socy, 137 Misc. 2d at 838, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
57. Justice Lehner stated:
Although the transaction may well have been structured to paint a different pic-
ture, the clear fact of the matter is that in return for the grant by the CPC of the
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Lehner's interpretation, the only legitimate way for the city to obtain
the so-called "additional $57 million in cash" would be to earmark that
sum for adjacent subway station improvements as defined in the zoning
ordinance. However, agreements pertaining to use of the $455 million
generated from the sale dictated that all funds, by definition including
the "additional $57 million," be spent for citywide capital and operat-
ing mass transit purposes. Therefore, the judge ruled the city's ap-
proval of the sale "null and void.""8
Unfortunately, Justice Lehner's misunderstanding of the city's mul-
tifaceted role in this transaction fatally taints his legal conclusion. His
analysis founders precisely on its failure to apprehend the crucial dis-
tinction between a "pure" incentive zoning transaction and the elabo-
rate public-private interactions factually presented by the Coliseum
deal. In the former, the city acts strictly as a regulator, while in the
latter, the city acts first as land seller, and then as regulator.
In a manner transcending legal correctness, however, Justice Leh-
ner's opinion bears witness to the formidable complication posed by
the "two hat" problem: the conflict of interest in the public sector's
identity as both land seller and land regulator. At its simplest, the
conflict arises because the city's interests in selling as opposed to regu-
lating land are almost invariably at odds. Consequently, the city's
motivations as seller may improperly influence its actions as regulator.
Justice Lehner's opinion also invites legitimate speculation about in-
centive zoning's innate friction with traditional planning and zoning
models, especially when the technique is used to encourage provision of
amenities geographically or conceptually "unrelated" to the incentive.
To disentangle the opinion's constructive insights from its analytical
confusions, it is helpful first to hypothesize a "pure" incentive zoning
transaction not presented by the Municipal Art Society case, and then
to distinguish it from the actual arrangements of the Coliseum sale.
B. A "Pure" Incentive Zoning Transaction
Imagine a scenario in which the private owner of a large site in mid-
town Manhattan, intending to develop an office building, applies for a
twenty percent floor-area-ratio-bonus, the City is obtaining not only $35 to $40
million of local subway improvements, but an additional $57 million in cash to be
employed for other purposes. This is not contemplated by the New York City
Zoning Resolution.
Id. at 837, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
58. Id. at 838, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
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subway bonus. With no ownership interest in the land, the city acts
exclusively in its regulatory capacity to administer the zoning laws. In
this role, the city grants an FAR bonus to the private developer pursu-
ant to section 81-53 of the Zoning Resolution. 9 In return for the FAR
bonus, the developer agrees to provide both adjacent subway improve-
ments costing $35-40 million and an additional $57 million cash contri-
bution to be used in the city's discretion for citywide mass transit
purposes.
Justice Lehner would be correct to strike down such an exercise of
incentive zoning because section 81-53 authorizes the city to award bo-
nuses only to encourage "major improvements for adjacent subway sta-
tions."'  Although the city might amend its zoning ordinance to
permit exchanges of bonuses for cash payments (as it did, for example,
in its Special Greenwich Street District zoning legislation,61) a bonus
granted under the existing language of section 81-53 in exchange for
money not designated for adjacent subway improvements would be ul-
tra vires of section 81-53. Indeed, were the developer to offer anything
but adjacent subway improvements, the same conclusion of illegality
would apply. In short, the hypothetical "pure" incentive zoning case
precisely fits the mold of Justice Lehner's "'cash sale' of a zoning bo-
nus." His conclusion that, "in return for the grant by the CPC of the
twenty percent floor-area-ratio-bonus, the City is obtaining not only
$35 to $40 million of local subway improvements, but an additional
$57 million in cash to be employed for other purposes," would ring
true.
In contrast, the Municipal Art Society case presents a fundamentally
different situation. As Justice Lehner himself outlined the facts, the
Coliseum deal involved the city first as selling landowner. Only after
the city and Boston Properties signed the sales agreement would the
city wear its regulator hat in a separate and on-its-own-merits regula-
tory proceeding to consider Boston Properties' application for the sub-
way bonus. While the city's real life ability to perform its two roles
separately and independently remains open to skepticism, especially
when its relative success or failure in one role directly depends on its
59. See supra notes 33 & 35 and accompanying text.
60. Id.
61. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
§§ 86-0410 to 86-0411 (1971); Office of Lower Manhattan Development, Office of the
Mayor, City of New York, Special Greenwich Street Development District 30 (Oct.
1971).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol39/iss1/2
ZONING FOR DOLLARS
actions in the other, it is instructive at this stage of the discussion to
assume such ability.62 Seen, then, through a selling landowner's eye,
the city's conduct appears perfectly understandable. Like a typical
seller, the city wanted to maximize sale revenue. Indeed, the RFP ex-
pressly stated that the primary consideration in selecting a winning bid
would be the price offered for the property.63 Whether that goal was
appropriate or wise as a matter of public policy is, of course, an impor-
tant question," but its legality is undisputed even by Justice Lehner's
opinion.65 The pivotal question, then, is whether the means chosen to
achieve the revenue maximization goal were legal. In order to answer
this question, it is necessary to understand the nature and effect of the
city's $57 million contingent price refund.
C. Understanding the $57 Million Contingent Price Refund
The city faced a "chicken-egg" dilemma: the Coliseum site would be
worth substantially more if the subway bonus was granted, but the city
would not render a bonus decision until after it selected a winning bid
62. See infra note 81 and accompanying text discussing the city's capacity to act
separately and independently.
63. See supra text accompanying note 30.
64. Disposition of publicly owned land raises difficult public policy issues. Too
often, cities reflexively adopt revenue maximization as their paramount goal. To the
nightmarish distress of accountants, some cities have even utilized public land sales to
close annual operating budget deficits. See, e.g., City of Boston, Redevelopment Propos-
als for Four Municipal Garages: An Interim Report passim (Oct. 1983) (discussing sale
to private sector of four municipally owned garages). Revenue maximization is fre-
quently pitted against physically appropriate levels of development, because achieve-
ment of one generally comes at the expense of the other. The Coliseum sale itself poses
the question whether occasional shadows cast over Central Park constitute an accepta-
ble tradeoff for extra municipal revenue. See Taylor, supra note 41, at 42. In the
heightened polemics of a Mayor Koch, are not more police and a little less light and air
better? In the equally charged response of environmental critics, the answer is a re-
sounding no. Neither side is a fortiori correct, but the debate highlights the need for a
public land disposition procedure that identifies and considers the public values impli-
cated by a given sale. While acknowledging that certain aspects of public-private nego-
tiations need some degree of privacy, much of this "apples and oranges" balancing
should occur in the sunshine. Ultimately, the process must determine whether receiving
the most money from the sale and spending it wisely best promotes the public interest,
or whether sacrificing some revenue to promote alternative goals results in a superior
final outcome. See generally Municipal Art Society, Restoring the Balance: A Report on
the Disposition of City-owned Land passim (June 1989).
65. See Municipal Art Soc'y, 137 Misc. 2d at 837, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 803 ("When
disposing of its property, government, of course, has an obligation to maximize the
revenue it receives, consistent with its governmental responsibilities.").
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and both parties signed the sales agreement. As the city understood its
situation, it would financially be out of the picture at the financially
critical juncture. Accordingly, if the city awarded the bonus, the new
private owner would be left with the exclusive enjoyment of any forth-
coming land value premium. 66 In a prime midtown Manhattan loca-
tion like Columbus Circle, that land value premium would be
substantial.
Framed within the operational context of incentive zoning, the city's
choice of the $57 million figure for its contingent price refund furnishes
the basis for making an educated guess about the value of the FAR
bonus. The essential thrust of incentive zoning is to encourage private
developers to engage in behavior not otherwise rewarded in the mar-
ketplace. Unless developers perceive a financial benefit in the tradeoff
between incentive and amenity, incentive zoning will not work. Calcu-
lated by the "cost-plus" formula, the value of the incentive must cover
the amenity's cost plus an additional amount sufficient to motivate the
developer to participate in the transaction.67 While imbuing that fact
with a negative inference for his overall conclusion, Justice Lehner
himself recognized that an incentive's value would be worth more than
the amenity's cost.68
66. See infra text accompanying notes 72-79 for a fuller understanding of the eco-
nomics of the bidding process.
67. See J. GETZELS & M. JAFFB, supra note 1, at 21 (describing J. Kayden's "cost-
plus" formula). The "cost-plus" formula calculates the amount of bonus floor area to
be granted for a desired public amenity:
Cost of amenity Conversion Plus
Net capitalized value Ratio Factor
of bonus s.f.
By dividing the capital cost of the amenity by the net capitalized value of a bonus square
foot, the total amount of rentable bonus floor area necessary to cover the cost of the
amenity is calculated. The "conversion ratio" translates this total from rentable square
feet to zoning square feet, in recognition of the fact that the bonus is delivered in zoning
square feet. Finally, the "plus factor" adds an amount above that necessary to cover the
amenity's cost. By employing unit costs of the amenity per square foot in the numera-
tor, the formula can compute the amount of bonus floor area adequate to encourage
provision of a square foot of amenity.
68. Justice Lehner stated:
Although the members of the CPC may well in good faith have approved the full
20% FAR bonus as a fair incentive for the developer agreeing to make $35 to 40
million of subway station improvements, the developer and the City officials who
approved the contract obviously recognized that this bonus was worth a great deal
more.
MunicipalArt Soc'y, 137 Misc. 2d at 838, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 804 (emphasis added). Thus,
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What, then, is the value of the incentive? A developer receiving the
full three FAR bonus would incur additional expenditures of $35-$40
million in subway improvements, as well as $57 million in cash (the
price reduction foregone upon award of the full bonus), totalling $92-
$97 million. In order to satisfy the "cost-plus" formula, the bonus
floor area would have to be worth this "cost" plus some incremental
amount. Dividing the $92-$97 million cost by 448,261 square feet (the
actual amount of bonus floor area represented by the three FAR bo-
nus) 69 yields a net capitalized value per bonus FAR square foot of at
least $205-$216.70
Not surprisingly, a comparison of this incentive value with the
square foot value reflected by Boston Properties' actual marketplace
offer confirms its reasonableness and thus supplies an important em-
piric check. Boston Properties effectively offered $490-$495 million for
the site, consisting of the $455 million purchase price and the $35-$40
million in subway improvements. Dividing the $490-$495 million by
the eighteen FAR floor area of 2,689,569 square feet produces a net
capitalized value per overall FAR square foot of $182-$184. The
above-determined bonus FAR square foot's slightly higher value
($205-$216) may reflect capitalization of a rent premium resulting
from the ability to charge more rent for higher bonus floors.7
Attempting to secure for itself a share of the additional land value
that would result if it did award a bonus, the city elected the pro-active
strategy, designed to influence bidding behavior, of the $57 million
contingent price refund. The idea appeared simple enough. Bids for
the site rested largely upon the market's assumption about applicable
zoning restrictions. For example, the site would yield higher bids as-
any reflexive comparison of the $35-$40 million subway improvement cost with the $57
million contingent price refund amount would reveal a fundamental misunderstanding
of the operation of incentive zoning.
69. Multiplied by 15 FAR, the 149,420 square foot site produces a base building of
2,241,307 square feet. The three FAR bonus of 448,261 square feet results in a total
project of 2,689,569 square feet. All figures are slightly off because of rounding. The
bonus figure contained in Justice Lehner's opinion, 448,500 square foot, is slightly
larger than the actual bonus.
70. "Net capitalized value per bonus square foot" means the capitalized value of a
square foot of office space less the cost of constructing that square foot. To obtain the
capitalized value, operating expenses are deducted from net income, and the resulting
amount is capitalized at an appropriate cap rate.
71. Because of their better views, higher floors usually earn a rent premium. See
Pollard, Topographic Amenities, Building Height, and the Supply of Urban Housing, 10
REGIONAL SCI. AND URB. ECON. 181, 196 (1980).
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suming the bonused eighteen FAR rather than the matter of right base
fifteen FAR. Yet, bidders could not know whether to ground their
offers on the matter of right base fifteen FAR, the bonused eighteen
FAR, or somewhere in between. By guaranteeing financial reimburse-
ment for the value of the amount of bonus not awarded, the contingent
price refund permitted potential buyers to offer, at no risk to them-
selves, an amount based on the bonused FAR. Functioning much like
an insurance policy, the strategy indemnified bidders against any po-
tential loss and shifted that financial risk to the city.
D. On Further Reflection: The Economic Effect of the $57 Million
Contingent Price Refund
Closer scrutiny of the city's contingent price refund strategy reveals
an ironic twist: the strategy would not necessarily yield additional rev-
enue to the city beyond that forthcoming had the city put the property
up for sale without conditions. With no $57 million contingent price
refund stipulation, incoming offers would reflect uncertainty as to the
applicable FAR. Potential buyers would bid the site's value at the mat-
ter of right base fifteen FAR, plus the net value of the bonus three
FAR discounted by the probability of obtaining the bonus. The follow-
ing equation describes the bid amount calculation:72
Equation One: B = V, + p(V2 - C)
where:
B is the expected bid amount;
V1 is the site's expected value at the matter of right base FAR;
p is the bidder's expectation of the probability the bonus would
be granted;
V2 is the expected value to the bidder of the bonus floor area;
C is the expected cost to the bidder of the subway improvements
amenity.
Expressed as a percentage, p represents the bidder's best guess about
the likelihood of obtaining the bonus and would be predicated on such
indicators as the city's past record in granting bonuses, the need for
adjacent subway improvements, and so forth.73 V2 equals the annual
income less annual expenses of the bonus floor area, capitalized at an
72. This equation assumes that all bidders have similar expectations about the site's
value, the probability the bonus would be granted, and so forth.
73. Section 81-535 of the zoning ordinance lists the specific criteria for the City
Planning Commission to consider. See supra note 35. Those with a more cynical bent
would add, first and foremost, the bidder's political connections.
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appropriate cap rate,74 less the capital cost of constructing the bonus
floor area.
Although the RFP instructed potential buyers to bid at the bonused
eighteen FAR, that instruction, standing alone without a refund guar-
antee, would not in fact have influenced bidders.75 Instead, as discussed
above, the $57 million contingent price refund would influence bidders
to offer a higher amount because of the assurance of recouping up to
$57 million if the bonus was not forthcoming. 76 The following equa-
tion describes the effect of the contingent price refund on bidding
behavior:
Equation Two: B = V + p(V 2 - C) + (1 -p)R
where:
B is the expected bid amount;
V, is the site's expected value at the matter of right base FAR;
p is the bidder's expectation of the probability the bonus would
be granted;
V2 is the expected value to the bidder of the bonus floor area;
C is the expected cost to the bidder of the subway improve-
ments amenity;
R is the contingent price refund amount promised by the city.7 7
As Equation Two suggests, the bidder would be willing to bid an addi-
tional amount (1 -p)R (the contingent price refund discounted by the
probability the bonus would not be granted, which is the condition pre-
cedent triggering the refund payment). The bidder is thus protected up
to $57 million against the possibility of overbidding in reliance upon a
bonused FAR value and subsequently failing to receive the bonus. By
74. The capitalization computation asks how much a person would be willing to
pay for the income stream represented by the bonus floor area. The cap rate reflects the
rate of return an investor would generally demand for that category of investment. See,
e.g., W. BRUEGGEMAN & L. STONE, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 331 (1981).
75. Although the RFP required the winning bidder to apply for the bonus, that
application presumably could be structured to assure City Planning Commission
rejection.
76. The winning bidder could subsequently obtain an amount of bonus floor area
ranging from zero to a maximum of three FAR. The sliding scale formula outlined in
the RFP attempted to assure the buyer that if only some, but not all, of the three FAR
bonus was awarded, the price would be adjusted correspondingly. For purposes of the
immediate analysis, the bidder is assumed to calculate only the possibility of receiving
the full three FAR bonus.
77. B, V1, p, V2, and C are the same as specified in Equation One. See supra text
accompanying note 72.
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mitigating the insured's risk of making a mistake, this "policy" thus
alters the insured's behavior in ways the city desires.
Compare two bidders. Both expect that there is a seventy-five per-
cent chance of procuring the subway bonus. Bidder X is not told about
a contingent price refund. Bidder Y is told that the sales price will be
subsequently reduced by $57 million if the city does not grant the bo-
nus. Bidder Y is able to increase its bid by the expected value of the
contingent price refund, Le., the refund discounted by the probability
of receiving it, and still be in as good a position as Bidder X. In this
example, Bidder Y's bid would be increased by $57 million multiplied
by the twenty-five percent chance of receiving the $57 million, or by
more than $14 million.
But the story does not end here. That the contingent price refund
would cause potential buyers to bid more for the Coliseum site is not
the same as saying that the city would ultimately end up with more
money than it would have had it not offered the refund. Although the
contingent price refund operated to decrease the downside risk of
overbidding for the bidder, it simultaneously introduced a downside
risk for the city by creating a potential obligation. The city would keep
the higher bid amount only if the bonus was ultimately granted. If, on
the other hand, the bonus was not granted, then the $57 million refund
would have to be paid, and the initially higher sale proceeds would be
commensurately reduced. Recalling the insurance analogy, the insurer
does best when it does not have to pay out on its policy. As described
by Equation Three, the additional bid amount would be exactly offset
by the potential price refund:
Equation Three:
S = V1 + p(V 2 - C) + (1 -p)R - (1 - p)R
= V, + p(V 2 - C)
where:
S is the city's expected proceeds from the sale;
V, is the site's expected value at the matter of right base FAR;
p is the bidder's expectation of the probability the bonus would
be granted;
V2 is the expected value to the bidder of the bonus floor area;
C is the expected cost to the bidder of the subway improve-
ments amenity;
R is the contingent price refund amount promised by the city.7
8
78. V, p, V2, C, and R are the same as specified in Equations One and Two. See
supra text accompanying notes 72 & 77.
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While the city would receive a bid increased by (1 -p)R (the contin-
gent price refund discounted by the probability the bidder would ulti-
mately receive it), the city's liability would increase by (1 -p)R (the
likelihood the city would have to pay the refund).79 Arithmetically,
the last two elements in Equation Three, (1 -p)R and (1 -p)R, cancel
each other out, and Equation Three's S, the city's expected sales pro-
ceeds, is exactly the same as Equation One's B, the bid amount forth-
coming had no contingent price refund been announced.
E. The "Two Hat" Problem
Yogi Berra is reputed to have said, "It ain't over 'til it's over." As
the above equations make clear, the city's ultimate revenue from its
sale of the Coliseum parcel would remain uncertain at the time the
sales agreement was reached, and would only be resolved once the City
Planning Commission concluded its bonus deliberations. Thus, the
city's claim to Boston Properties' winning offer did not necessarily in-
clude what Justice Lehner described as an "additional $57 million in
cash." Any such amount would be subtracted from the $455 million
bid by refund upon a negative bonus decision. However, because Jus-
tice Lehner knew by the time of his opinion that the city in fact had
granted the bonus, he could make his ex post ex ante characterization
about an "additional $57 million in cash," and thereby implicate the
"two hat" problem. As he saw it, "government may not place itself in
the position of reaping a cash premium because one of its agencies be-
stows a zoning benefit upon a developer. Zoning benefits are not cash
items.""0
Should the single fact that the city's retention of $57 million in sale
proceeds causally depended upon the outcome of its bonus decision
render the entire deal illegal? A comparison of the city's conduct with
that of a hypothetical private seller is illuminating. Imagine the same
Coliseum transaction except that the land is originally owned by a pri-
vate party. The hypothetical private owner agrees to sell the Coliseum
site to Boston Properties for $455 million, contingent on Boston
Properties' subsequent success in obtaining the three FAR subway bo-
79. Equation Three assumes that the bidder's forecast of p (the probability the bo-
nus would be granted), is the same as the actual probability the bonus would be granted.
Although the bidder in fact may have a higher or lower forecast of probability than the
actual probability, the assumption provides a reasonable simplification for purposes of
this discussion.
80. MunicipalArt Soc'y, 137 Misc. 2d at 838, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
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nus. Boston Properties agrees to apply for and make its best efforts to
obtain the bonus, and the private seller agrees to reduce the $455 mil-
lion purchase price by $57 million if no bonus is ultimately obtained.
No one, presumably not even Justice Lehner, could object to such a
transaction. It neither violates the zoning ordinance nor any other
conceivable law on the books. To the contrary, land sales agreements
between private parties commonly include contingency clauses about
"condition subsequent" events such as zoning approvals and financing.
Identical in every respect to the actual Coliseum transaction except
for the seller's identity, the above hypothetical singularly trains the
legal inquiry on whether the city's original ownership of the site, as
opposed to a private party's original ownership, should make the dis-
positive difference. Of course, there is an obvious distinction between a
city government and a private owner selling property: private owners
do not control zoning, whereas city governments do. By increasing
allowable density on a site, for example, the city can commensurately
increase the price it receives for the site. The concurrent city identity
as seller and regulator, and the consequent tension between revenue-
maximizing and regulatory goals, could encourage local governments
to abandon good city planning practices, or even to disregard statuto-
rily defined planning guidelines, in order to maximize revenue from
land sales.
The "two hat" problem, with its troublesome identity of seller and
regulator, lurks close to the surface of Justice Lehner's opinion."1 It
raises one of three potential conflicts of interest: a demonstrated, struc-
tural, or appearance conflict. In a demonstrated conflict, a city makes
a zoning decision for the express purpose of increasing the price it ob-
tains for selling its land, thereby subverting traditional planning justifi-
cations underlying land use regulation. In a structural conflict, the
specific public agency responsible for land sales also makes the zoning
decisions and is presumed incapable of divorcing land value from plan-
ning implications. In an appearance conflict, the mere possibility that
improper considerations influenced the city's zoning decision, even if
separate and insulated agencies are involved, contaminates the
decision.
In the Municipal Art Society case, the city's dual role implicates all
three potential conflicts, raising the question whether the relevant city
81. Of course, the "two hat" problem exists even when the city is not selling land,
because the city has an incentive to zone permissibly in order to realize maximum prop-
erty tax revenues from a parcel.
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agencies granted the special permit for the zoning bonus in order to
preclude payment of the $57 million contingent price refund to the de-
veloper, thereby assuring the city maximum revenue from the sale.
However, Justice Lehner's opinion never specifically addresses these
conflicts. With respect to the demonstrated conflict, his opinion makes
no finding that the City Planning Commission or Board of Estimate
diverged from the ordinance's listed criteria when granting the special
permit for the subway improvements bonus. The fifty-page City Plan-
ning Commission report on Boston Properties' application includes de-
tailed and express findings on each of the elements that section 81-53
requires. 2 Nor did Justice Lehner evince any direct or circumstantial
evidence that the Commission or Board awarded the bonus partially or
wholly to preclude payment of the $57 million price refund. To the
contrary, Justice Lehner stated that "the members of the [City Planning
Commission] may well in good faith have approved the full 20% FAR
bonus as a fair incentive for the developer agreeing to make $35 to $40
million of subway station improvements. ... , Thus, actual bad faith
cannot be said to have muddied the waters. As for structural or ap-
pearance conflicts, the opinion never discusses the inherent impossibil-
ity of insulating the Commission's zoning bonus decision from its
revenue maximization implications, or the inherent unbelievability of
such separation in the mind of a reasonable public.
Justice Lehner invalidated the Coliseum Center transaction because
the contract of sale provided for what he deemed an "illegal pay-
ment,"'84 "illegal" because it was not contemplated by the zoning reso-
lution.85 With no discussion of conflicts problems or other
irregularities in the subsequent grant of a bonus pursuant to section 81-
53, however, the opinion fails to answer satisfactorily how the city, as
seller, acted illegally when it accounted for the site's increased value at
an eighteen FAR. If the technical correctness of Justice Lehner's legal
analysis and conclusion is doubtful, his failure to discuss the conflicts
issues nonetheless should not obscure their significance. Stripping
away formalistic excuses, the city's defense of its actions rings hollow
at the gut level. Yes, the city's sales and zoning bonus procedures were
82. See Resolution of City Planning Commission Regarding Application for Grant
of Special Permit for Floor Area Bonus, supra note 44, at A490-540.
83. Municipal Art Soc'y, 137 Misc. 2d at 838, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 804 (emphasis
added).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 837, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
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largely separate, even if the Board of Estimate played a final approval
role in both. Yes, the City Planning Commission, designated to make
the initial special permit decision on the subway improvements bonus
application, did not play any formal role in the selling of the site. Yes,
nothing in the record suggests that the subway improvements bonus
was not fully justified on its own merits. In the end, however, no
amount of formalistic defense can disguise the salient fact that the city
qua city controlled its own destiny for purposes of final disposition of
the $57 million refund. The city alone could trigger or quash the re-
fund. Is it believable that the City Planning Commission, whose mem-
bers the mayor appoints, would not grant the bonus when it knew that
$57 million in municipal revenue was riding on its decision? Is it be-
lievable that the Board of Estimate, responsible for approving both the
sales transaction and the bonus, could effectively partition the two de-
cisions? No matter how high or impervious a chinese wall existed be-
tween relevant city agencies, the parties knew what the bonus decision
meant to the city coffers. In short, this case makes a clarion call for the
fashioning of new policy and legal frameworks to govern the disposi-
tion of publicly owned land.8 6
F. The Relationship Issue
Justice Lehner's faulty conception of the $57 million, as part of the
incentive zoning transaction, propelled him to focus on another aspect
of the technique: the nature of the relationship between incentive and
amenity. For Justice Lehner, the city's failure to earmark the $57 mil-
lion for adjacent subway improvements caused an improper decoupling
between the incentive's burden on the surrounding Columbus Circle
neighborhood and the amenity's potentially offsetting neighborhood
benefits.
87
86. See Municipal Art Society, Restoring the Balance, supra note 64 passim.
87. Justice Lehner declared:
Increasing the bulk of a project imposes a certain burden on the local community.
The Zoning Resolution provides a means by which, in return for the imposition of
that burden, a benefit is granted to the community.
Here, the major portion of the benefit which the purchaser is willing to pay for
the right to construct a building of greater density than is permitted "as of right" is
to be paid to the City to be employed for purposes other than local improvements. A
proper quid pro quo for the grant of the right to increase the bulk of a building may
not be the payment of additional cash into the City's coffers for citywide use.
MunicipalArt Soc'y, 137 Misc. 2d at 837-38, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 803-04 (emphasis added).
Earlier in his opinion, Justice Lehner quoted a 1982 City Planning Commission report
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As discussed earlier,8" if classified as an amenity the developer offers
in return for a three FAR bonus, a cash payment of $57 million or, for
that matter, a proffer of anything but adjacent subway improvements,
would violate section 81-53 of the zoning ordinance. However, when
the $57 million is correctly understood as part of the incentive's value
to the landowner, and thus as legitimately retainable by the city in its
capacity as land seller, the $57 million becomes equivalent to ordinary
revenue generated by public land sales. As such, the money would face
no geographical or other earmarking restriction and could fund city-
wide municipal budgetary activities such as police, fire, and sanitation,
without contravening zoning or other laws governing city conduct.
Tethered to the specific tradeoff authorized by the express language
of section 81-53, extra floor area for adjacent subway improvements,
Justice Lehner's broad dictum, "[a] proper quid pro quo for the grant
of the right to increase the bulk of a building may not be the payment
of additional cash into the City's coffers for citywide use,"89 is unexcep-
tional.' Untethered to section 81-53-and Justice Lehner's opinion
leaves open this interpretation-his rule has the dramatic effect of
grounding the newest statutorily authorized exercises of incentive zon-
ing through which bonus floor area is traded for funding or provision
of such arguably "unrelated" amenities as low-income housing, cul-
tural facilities, day care centers, and job training. These amenities are
"unrelated" in the sense that they predominantly serve citywide needs,
fail to mitigate the negative physical impacts of the bonus floor area on
the immediate neighborhood, and are frequently located off-site from
the bonus floor area.
that explicitly rejected use of incentives to encourage provision of non-adjacent subway
improvements:
A floor area bonus is provided for a substantial subway entrance improvement
adjacent to a development site.... An off-site subway-station improvement does
not provide any compensating reduction in density. The proposed bonus is justi-
fied because it improves direct access to the larger development. For off-site sub-
way improvements direct financial incentives appear to be more appropriate than
zoning measures.
Id. at 836, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 803 (quoting New York City Planning Commission, MID-
TOWN ZONING, Mar. 1982, at 36-37).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
89. Municipal Art Soc'y, 137 Misc. 2d at 838, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 803-04 (emphasis
added).
90. See supra text accompanying note 60 (discussing section 81-53 authorizing the
award of bonuses exclusively to encourage major improvements of adjacent subway
stations).
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Although Justice Lehner's opinion contains no legal foundation for a
sweeping interpretation of his rule, it is easy to comprehend his visceral
discomfort with the lack of a relationship between incentive and amen-
ity. That disconnection raises substantial questions about fundamental
fairness and planning policy. For example, if a neighborhood must en-
dure the burdens associated with the incentive, then why should it not
garner the lion's share of the benefits associated with the amenity?
Should not the amenity mitigate, in some fashion, the bonus floor
area's local impact - extra street and sidewalk congestion and the loss
of light and air at ground level? Does not the grant of an incentive for
an unrelated amenity ultimately undermine the zoning ordinance's ba-
sic integrity?
G. The Traditional Physical Planning Approach
Justice Lehner's relationship declaration resonates with the tradi-
tional physical planning approach to zoning.91 Applied to specific sites
and neighborhoods, zoning is a marriage of the sacred and the profane.
Because zoning decisions can cause monumental financial gains or
losses for private developers, it is not surprising that the profane some-
times overrules the sacred. The numerous real life examples of zoning
actions unjustifiable on any traditional physical planning ground reflect
the push and pull of diverse private, neighborhood, and public interests
within a city.92 At the same time, traditional physical planning criteria
play an important role in zoning decisions. City planners, the usual
final decision-makers on zoning's trio of use, height, and bulk restric-
tions, explore numerous quantitative and qualitative features in formu-
lating zoning recommendations for elected officials. They measure the
capacity of public infrastructure such as sewer and water pipes, streets,
sidewalks, and mass transit. They weigh the area's characteristics, in-
cluding existing buildings' uses, heights, and bulks. They review new
91. The rhetoric of the traditional physical planning approach, which monopolized
zoning professionals during the first decades of zoning, more recently has given way to
the reality of zoning's inherent impact on social and economic concerns. See, e.g., 5 N.
WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 163.23, at 877 (1985):
Land use controls may be used, and are now probably used, as much for influenc-
ing economic development and the social structure as for physical planning goals.
In many situations, social and economic factors are in fact the most important
elements in a decision.... It is therefore a little late to start a debate on whether
such factors should be taken into consideration in physical planning decisions.
Id.
92. See, e.g., R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME passim (1966).
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development's impact on light and air at street level. While it would be
naive to describe such traditional physical planning criteria as neutral,
objective, or precise in an absolute sense, they nonetheless represent the
professionally developed and accepted source materials informing the
planner's judgment about the appropriate level of development for a
given geographical location.93
When encouraging the provision of "unrelated" amenities, incentive
zoning inherently undermines this regime. The most popular incen-
tive, the floor area bonus, promotes buildings that exceed the density
that traditional physical planning criteria dictate. If the amenity is
"unrelated" to the incentive, in the sense that it fails to mitigate the
incentive's harmful physical impacts on the surrounding area, 94 then
the status of traditional physical planning criteria is depreciated. New
York City's original 1961 incentive zoning plazas and arcades repre-
sented classic prototypes of "related" amenities." The on-site provi-
sion of these effectively larger sidewalks made them "density-
ameliorating," more than offsetting additional sidewalk congestion cre-
ated by the extra employees occupying the incentive's bonus floor area.
Similarly, section 81-53's amenity of adjacent subway improvements
mitigates the impact of additional office employees by expanding the
capacity of mass transit facilities. 96 Of course, neither of these ameni-
ties addresses all deleterious impacts of bonus space. For example, the
subway improvements do not redress loss of light and air at street level.
At the same time, the amenities presumably address broader problems
than those which the bonus space alone causes.97 If not perfect, the
relationship between an incentive's burden and an amenity's benefit is
sufficient.
Citywide social amenities such as low-income housing, cultural facil-
ities, day care centers, and job training, however, differ from "density-
93. Planners and public officials also assess the city's fiscal and economic develop-
ment needs before setting levels of development.
94. For a quantitative estimate of some of the impacts bonus floor area has on a
city, see J. KAYDEN, supra note 7, at 54-57.
95. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
§§ 33-131, 33-151 (1973).
96. Assuming a "rule of thumb" of 200 square feet per office employee, the 448,261
square feet of bonus floor area awarded to the Coliseum development would generate
2,241 additional employees, many of whom would use mass transit to commute to and
from work.
97. It would be strange indeed for a city to encourage amenities whose sole purpose
would be mitigation of the incentive's deleterious impact.
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
28 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 39:3
ameliorating" amenities. Although these amenities may constitute vi-
tal public benefits to the city as a whole, they do not strictly mitigate
the incentive's localized physical burden. For example, the provision
of low-income housing across town does not lessen the additional con-
gestion caused by the floor area bonus. Even though provided on-site
within the Times Square area, New York City's celebrated incentive
zoning amenity of theatres lacks the "density-ameliorating" qualities
that distinguish urban design amenities of plazas and arcades.9" These
types of regulatory trades are not unlike a floor area bonus given to an
office tower in one section of a city in return for provision of a plaza in
another, easily understood as a clear severing of the favored physical
relationship.
H. An Alternative to the Traditional Physical Planning Approach
Stemming from the traditional physical planning approach to zon-
ing, in which physical values are implicitly preferred above others, the
foregoing discussion ignores the fact that incentive zoning for unre-
lated amenities does nothing more than pit a different set of public val-
ues against the traditional physical planning values. Listen to incentive
zoning's "Tale of Two Cities." Assume that a city authorizes a maxi-
mum matter of right fifteen FAR in its central business district. Under
one scenario, the city employs incentive zoning strictly for related
amenities such as plazas and arcades. The average built FAR on most
sites in its central business district is now eighteen, including the three
FAR bonuses, but the buildings are surrounded by the related plazas
and arcades. Under another scenario, the city employs incentive zon-
ing for unrelated amenities of low-income housing, cultural facilities,
and day care centers. The average built FAR on most sites in its cen-
tral business district is also eighteen. Unlike the city in the first scena-
rio, however, this city does not have plazas and arcades surrounding its
buildings. Instead, it contains an alternate set of amenities: 1,000 units
of low-income housing, two theatres, and five day care centers dis-
persed throughout its jurisdiction. Has the city in the second scenario
made a less valid public choice than the city in the first? Is it illegal or
improper for citizens choosing the second scenario to decide they are
willing to tolerate more congestion in order to obtain a substitute array
of public benefits? Is it not within the province of communities to
make exactly such judgments about the kinds of environments they
98. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
§ 81.00 (1973).
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want?99
Moreover, the focus on a traditional physical planning connection
between incentive and amenity overlooks the possibility of social and
economic linkages as well. For example, office development may gen-
erate harmful short-term price impacts on existing city residents by
accommodating employees who consume housing in nearby neighbor-
hoods."°° New office towers may replace light industrial and ware-
house structures, creating a job-skill mismatch for dislocated blue
collar workers. The high rents office space fetches may crowd out con-
venient day care centers which would otherwise make it easier for em-
ployees with children to take office jobs. If such connections are
conceptually more complex1 °1 and empirically more elusive,1 2 they
are no less worthy of consideration than the connections more easily
99. But see infra text accompanying notes 104-60 discussing Nollan's impact on the
legality of incentive zoning for unrelated amenities.
100. See Kayden & Pollard, Linkage Ordinances and Traditional Exactions Analy-
sis: The Connection Between Office Development and Housing, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 127, 132-36 (1987).
101. For example, economists would express efficiency concerns only about "real"
externalities of office development, such as its impact on public infrastructure and light
and air at street level, and not about its "pecuniary" externalities, such as its price
impact on housing or job availability. See Kayden & Pollard, supra note 100, at 134
n.29. See generally S. RHOADS, THE ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF THE WORLD 269 (1985).
Under that view, office developments should internalize only the costs imposed upon
"collective goods" of infrastructure and light and air, and not those imposed upon "pri-
vate goods" of housing and jobs. On the other hand, third parties suffering negative
price impacts because of office development may marshall equity arguments to support
claims for compensatory relief of affordable housing or job training amenities. See
Kayden & Pollard, supra note 100, at 134 n.29.
Other questions arise regarding the appropriateness of asking office developers to pro-
vide facilities and services, such as day care and theatres, that the private sector itself
has traditionally provided. Because employees eat and go to movies, may office devel-
opers be asked to build supermarkets and cinemas? In addition, are office developments
themselves responsible for increased pressure on housing markets, or are employers who
rent space and hire employees, or consumers who purchase goods and services, ulti-
mately responsible? In incentive zoning transactions, where developers voluntarily pro-
vide such amenities, these questions hold less significance than in situations forcing
developers to provide such amenities. But see infra notes 104-160 and accompanying
text discussing Nollan.
102. For example, owing to imperfect or unavailable data, the determination of
housing price impacts associated with office development requires assumptions that un-
dermine the definitive nature of quantitative study results. See Kayden & Pollard, supra
note 100, at 135 n.31 (qualifying conclusions drawn from study of Boston housing
market).
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documented in the strict accounting sense between bonus floor area
and plazas.
The traditional physical planning assault on incentive zoning for un-
related amenities ultimately is disappointing because it fails to recog-
nize the political economy of cities. To maintain economic
competitiveness and a good working and living environment, cities find
it necessary to burnish the social and economic as well as the physical
aspects of their jurisdictions. Local governments routinely decide be-
tween conflicting "apples and oranges" public values whenever they
review a proposed real estate development project. Veterans of the
rhetoric and substance of "growth" versus "no growth" debates, to-
day's city officials are accustomed to balancing the need for increased
jobs and property tax revenues against the maintenance of existing
community character and acceptable levels of congestion. The zoning
map itself intrinsically reflects the community's advance judgment
about such tradeoffs. Disparate value tradeoffs are hardly confined to
regulatory decisions about development. When cities allocate more tax
dollars for police and less for libraries, or when they build a convention
center and eliminate a drug treatment facility, they are necessarily
choosing between diverse public interests. If public officials may bal-
ance police against libraries, then it is difficult to contend that they may
not pit additional congestion against social amenities.1 3
III. THE NOLLAN CASE
On its face, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission'04 appears
quite unlike Municipal Art Society v. City of New York. 10 5 Municipal
Art Society comprised a high-profile cast of characters, millions of dol-
lars in potential private profit and public revenue, and a threatening
shadow over the city's beloved Central Park. Nollan entailed a conflict
between a couple's desire to replace their oceanfront bungalow with a
new house and the California Coastal Commission's efforts to obtain
an easement for the public to walk along the couple's beach. More-
over, where Justice Lehner expressly scrutinized and condemned an
exercise of incentive zoning, the Nollan opinion does not even mention
the words "incentive zoning." Thus, it is ironic that Nollan, not Mu-
nicipal Art Society, ultimately represents the crucial watershed for the
103. But see infra text accompanying note 136.
104. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
105. 137 Misc. 2d 832, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
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technique. If the Nollan opinion applies, then Justice Lehner's statu-
tory interpretation about the necessary relationship between incentive
and amenity is endowed with a constitutional foundation, and the ap-
plecart of incentive zoning for unrelated amenities is nationally upset.
If Nollan does not apply, however, then Justice Lebner's views reach
beyond his opinion only to the extent they persuade other judges con-
fronted with similar legal challenges.
The facts of Nollan are central to the inquiry. Pat and Marilyn Nol-
Ian leased, with an option to buy, a small beachfront lot containing a
521 square foot bungalow, located north of Los Angeles on the Pacific
coast in Ventura County. 1" Wanting to replace the bungalow with a
new 1,674 square foot two-story single-family home,10 7 the Nollans ap-
plied to the California Coastal Commission for the required coastal
development permit.108 The Commission granted the permit, subject
to the condition that the Nollans provide an easement allowing the
public to walk north and south on their beach between the mean high
tide line and their seawall." 9 The Commission imposed the easement
condition because it found that the new house would block views to the
ocean, would contribute to "a 'wall' of residential structures [prevent-
ing the public] psychologically.., from realizing a stretch of coastline
exists nearby that they have every right to visit," and would add to
106. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827, 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although Justice
Scalia's majority opinion referred to the bungalow as having 504 square feet, id. at 827,
the correct figure (used by Justice Brennan in his dissent) appears to be 521. See Appel-
lant's Jurisdictional Statement at E-36, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987).
107. In order to exercise their purchase option, the Nollans were required by deed
restriction to demolish the bungalow and replace it with a new structure. Nollan, 483
U.S. at 828. Apparently included in the original subdivision and conveyancing agree-
ments for a large land holding along the coast, this restriction operated to ensure that
all lot owners built and maintained quality properties, in effect a good neighbor policy.
108. Id.
109. Id. Under California law, the historic mean high tide line demarcated the
boundary between private and public domains. Id. at 827. Thus, at low tide, the public
could walk along the coast, between the low and high tide lines, without trespassing on
the Nollans' beach. At high tide, however, beachcombers would have to swim north
and south, insofar as the only beach above water would be on the Noilans' property. At
its maximum distance, the Nollans' seawall lay 10 feet east of the mean high tide line.
Id. at 853 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The easement condition would make it easier for
the public to walk directly between the Faria County Park public beach, one quarter
mile up the coast from the Nollans' beach, and the Cove public beach, 1,800 feet to the
south. Id. at 827.
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private use of the coast. "' The Nollans sued the Commission, arguing
that the imposition of the permit condition effected a taking of their
private property in violation of the fifth amendment's just compensa-
tion clause."'
In its five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court sided
with the Nollans." 2 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that
the easement condition failed to substantially advance the same as-
sumed legitimate state interests harmed by construction of the new
house, and thus violated the just compensation clause. 1 3 He first as-
serted that the Commission could not have demanded outright the con-
veyance of an easement had the Nollans simply maintained their
existing bungalow use, because government actions causing a "perma-
nent physical occupation" defeat the landowner's cardinal property
right to exclude others.114 Thus, he continued, the question for the
Court was whether requiring the conveyance of the easement as a con-
dition for issuing a land use permit altered the constitutional
judgment."15
Assuming the legitimacy of the Commission's declared public pur-
poses, Justice Scalia reasoned that the Commission either could have
refused permission altogether to construct the new house if construc-
tion would "substantially impede" such purposes,' 1 6 or could have at-
110. Id. at 828-29 (quoting California Coastal Commission's factual findings).
111. The just compensation clause states, "[Nior shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONSr. amend. V. The California Supe-
rior Court ruled in the Nollans' favor on statutory grounds, concluding that the Com-
mission's administrative findings as to the burden on beach access caused by the new
house were inadequate. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829. The Court of Appeals reversed that
ruling, and also held that the condition did not violate the just compensation clause. Id.
at 830. The California Supreme Court declined to review the case.
112. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell,
and O'Connor, delivered the Court's opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, filed a dissent. Justice Blackmun filed a dissent and also joined one authored by
Justice Stevens.
113. The Court assumed, without deciding, the legitimacy of the declared Commis-
sion purposes. Id. at 835.
114. Id. at 831 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 432-33 n.9 (1982)). See, eg., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35; Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). But see infra note 118.
115. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
116. Id. at 837. Presumably to flag the "economic viability" prong of just compen-
sation clause jurisprudence, Justice Scalia's majority appended the caveat, "unless the
denial would interfere so drastically with the Nollans' use of their property as to consti-
tute a taking." Id. at 836 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
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tached a condition to the construction that "serves the same
governmental purposes as the development ban."1  Thus, in service of
the Commission's stated goals of protecting the public's ability to see
the beach, overcoming the "psychological barrier" caused by coastal
development, and preventing congestion on the public beaches, the
Commission could have banned the new house, or imposed, for exam-
ple, the following conditions actually suggested by Justice Scalia:
height and width limitations, a fence ban, or most remarkably because
it would constitute a permanent physical occupation, a requirement
that the Nollans provide "a viewing spot on their property for pass-
ersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would inter-
fere."' 1" Because the actual easement condition failed to advance any
104 (1978)); see, eg., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). As a boiler-
plate reminder that owners are generally entitled to economically viable use of their
property, no matter how significant the public purpose underlying the regulation, the
caveat is virtually axiomatic. See, eg., Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). As an ironclad guarantee of property rights in all
cases, however, the caveat confficts with the idea that owners are not entitled to eco-
nomically viable use of their property if such use causes a nuisance or similarly harms
the public interest. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 210 Cal. App.3d 1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 866
(1990); cf. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887). Indeed, one may argue that such uses are not part of the individual's pri-
vate property right at all. Thus, to the extent that substantial impediments to legitimate
public purposes arising from the Nollans' new house might be analogized to a nuisance,
a ban on the new house might not effect a taking even under the economic viability
analysis.
117. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. Justice Scalia sprinkled his opinion with several for-
mulations of the test. For example, "The evident constitutional propriety disappears,
however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end
advanced as the justification for the prohibition," thereby severing "that essential
nexus." Id. He agreed with the Commission's own version that the condition must
"serve the same legitimate police-power purpose[s] as a refusal" to grant the permit. Id.
at 836. He talked about the "lack of nexus between the condition and the original
purpose of the building restriction." Id. at 837.
118. Id. at 836. Justice Scalia's declared willingness to countenance a public view-
ing spot on the Nollans' front lawn (presumably equipped with oversized steel binocu-
lars on stanchions that cost a quarter per view) should be treated warily. After all, it
must be remembered, the Court only assumed the legitimacy of the Commission's visual
access public purpose constituting the predicate for upholding a ban on the new house,
or alternatively, a viewing spot condition.
Taken at face value, however, Justice Scalia's approval of a physical invasion invites
further speculation. Previously, he argued that, had the Nollans retained the existing
bungalow, the Commission could not have required outright the easement, because gov-
ernment actions causing a 'permanent physical occupation'" defeat the owner's prop-
erty right to exclude others. Id. at 831-32. What if, however, the definition of a
nuisance altered over time to cover uses of private property blocking significant views?
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of the asserted purposes - permitting people to walk along the Nol-
lans' beach would not mitigate burdens on visual access to the ocean
caused by the new house, or presumably, address the two other Com-
mission goals - the Court struck down the condition. 19
A. THE NOLLAN RATIONALE AND INCENTIVE ZONING:
VOLUNTARINESS DENIED
At first glance, Nollan would appear to have little relevance to incen-
tive zoning. Where the technique involves landowners who voluntarily
provide amenities in return for incentives, were not the Nollans forced
to provide the beach access easement? Appearances can be deceiving.
The majority's rationale effectively recasts the voluntary operation of
all incentive zoning transactions. Consequently, the opinion threatens
to prohibit exercises of the technique for unrelated amenities.
Justice Scalia argued that, because "the right to build on one's own
property-even though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate per-
mitting requirements--cannot remotely be described as a 'governmen-
tal benefit,"' the Commission's attempt to trade the new house permit
for the beach easement could not a priori reflect a "voluntary 'ex-
change.' ,,12o If his predicate "right to build on one's own property,"
subject to "legitimate permitting requirements," means nothing more
than the boilerplate right to use one's property, subject to government
regulations serving the public interest, then this part of his argument is
axiomatic.12' The theory that the sovereign grants private property
At that point, one might suppose, the Commission could ban the existing offending
bungalow (assuming it blocked the view), just as government banned the existing brick
yard use in Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), and the existing brewery use
in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), without running afoul of the Constitution.
Cf. Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 315, 187 N.E.2d 142,145 (1963) (in face of
growing suburbanization, non-negligently run piggery found to be a nuisance and or-
dered to shut down within reasonable time). Property owners have never enjoyed a
private property right to maintain nuisances. See, e.g., Kmiec, The Original Under-
standing of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630,
1635 (1988) (citing Blackstone and Madison). Under this analysis, a government-au-
thorized physical invasion condition imposed on an existing use of property that served
the same interest as a ban on the existing use would be equally constitutional under
Justice Scalia's reasoning.
119. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839. The Court did not elaborate on the inadequate rela-
tionship between the beach easement and the "psychological barrier" and "public beach
congestion" concerns.
120. Id. at 833 n.2 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007
(1984)).
121. If the "right to build" literally meant the "right to build," then owners of
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rights, making them "governmental benefits," and thus can take all of
them away without compensation, is upended by the express language
of the just compensation clause and the legion of Supreme Court opin-
ions interpreting its scope.122
As a matter of logic, however, it does not follow from Justice Scalia's
"right to build" axiom that a "voluntary exchange" of property rights
for public amenities could never take place, in Nollan, or more broadly,
in other land use cases involving special permits with conditions. The
definition of "voluntariness" is fraught with conceptual and linguistic
properties fully developed under existing zoning conceivably could claim that this
"right" allowed them to exceed zoning. Of course, to the contrary, there may even be
cases where all building would be unacceptable. Cf. First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1989)
(although the court unconvincingly urged as an alternative holding that the Church
retained viable use of its property), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 866 (1990).
122. See, eg., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Although property rights "are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an in-
dependent source such as state law," Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)),
a state could not pass a law automatically making all private property public.
Against the backdrop of Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), Justices
Scalia and Brennan debated the precise nature of the Nollans' property interest. In
Ruckelshaus, a chemical company applying for pesticide registration under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) alleged that certain provisions of
the Act effected a taking of its property. The provisions authorized the Environmental
Protection Agency to use data one applicant submitted for pesticide registration in eval-
uating a subsequent application, and to disclose publicly some of the submitted data.
Although the Court agreed that the company's trade secrets submitted to support its
registration application were property deserving protection under the just compensation
clause, id. at 1003, the Court found that FIFRA did not effect a taking. Id. at 1013.
The Court reasoned:
[A]s long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under which the data are submit-
ted, and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate Government interest, a
voluntary submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advan-
tages of a registration can hardly be called a taking.
Id. at 1007. Likening the Nollans' application for a coastal development permit to
Monsanto's application for pesticide registration, Justice Brennan argued that the ra-
tionale in Monsanto should equally apply here. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 860 n.10 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). To Justice Scalia's reply that the "right to build on one's own property
... cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit,'" id., Justice Brennan
scoffed at the hint of a "privileged natural rights status" for property development and
invoked Locke's labor theory of value for the proposition that Monsanto would have a
superior claim over the Nollans in any event. Id.; see J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREA-
TISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 15-26
(1946).
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challenges. 123 On what basis did Justice Scalia determine that the ex-
change of the new house for the beach easement amenity was not vol-
untary? He neither reviewed the statutory framework governing the
Commission's issuance of coastal permits to establish the matter of
right property use, nor canvassed the Nollans' expectations regarding
their property. Furthermore, Justice Scalia did not elucidate a core
constitutional property rights theory rendering such inquiries nuga-
tory. Instead, he appears to have assumed sub silentio that the "right
to build ... subject to legitimate permitting requirements" included
construction of the Nollans' new house, thereby converting the beach
easement into a requirement imposed upon a right. 24
Thus defined, Justice Scalia's unremarkable axiom becomes a novel
constitutional principle: owners are entitled to whatever property use
government conditionally authorizes as a matter of constitutional
right, subject only to conditions serving the same public interest as that
served by prohibiting the conditional use. Even if the Commission as-
sumedly could have banned the new house altogether, its conditional
willingness to allow it "constitutionalized" the Nollans' right to the
house. At that point, a house for beach easement trade definitionally
could not reflect a "voluntary exchange," because the Commission
could not trade something to which the Nollans were already entitled.
Justice Scalia's property rights approach reduces the rest of his opin-
ion to a foregone conclusion, commanding a constitutional analysis no
123. See, e.g., Kreimer Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1351-78 (1984); Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSO-
PHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440-50 (S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes & M. White eds.
1969); Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1428-56 (1989)
(discussing theories of coercion in cases, philosophy, and private law).
124. Justice Brennan's dissent embraced the opposite conclusion. In a factual char-
acterization reminiscent of incentive zoning, Justice Brennan wrote:
[T]he character of the regulation in this case is not unilateral government action,
but a condition on approval of a development request submitted by appellants.
The State has not sought to interfere with any pre-existing property interest, but
has responded to appellants' proposal to intensify development on the coast. Ap-
pellants themselves chose to submit a new development application, and could
claim no property interest in its approval. They were aware that approval of such
development would be conditioned on preservation of adequate public access to the
ocean. The State has initiated no action against appellants' property; had the Nol-
lans' (sic) not proposed more intensive development in the coastal zone, they would
never have been subject to the provision that they challenge.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 855-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's assumption may be
factually more correct than Justice Brennan's assumption. See infra text accompanying
notes 147-52.
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different than when government directly imposes burdens on matter of
right development. As a general rule, government may not force land-
owners to solve problems not of their own making. Otherwise, the just
compensation clause's fundamental purpose, to ensure that individuals
do not bear burdens more properly borne by society at large, would be
thwarted. To prevent this occurrence, the clause's heavy machinery
roars into action and limits government to the appending of burdens
proportionally addressing harms or needs which the proposed develop-
ment has generated.' 25 The Commission could no more compel the
Nollans to provide the beach easement than it could compel them to
provide a small maritime museum, because neither of these amenities
mitigates the harm to the Commission-declared public interest in visual
access assumedly caused by the conditional property use of a new
house. Justice Scalia's string citation of twenty state court mandatory
subdivision exaction and impact fees cases, in which providing ameni-
ties is a precondition to any development whatsoever, merely under-
scores the understanding that he viewed the beach easement as an
imposition on a right.'26 His choice of words is similarly pointed. For
example, he stated that, "[u]nless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction
is not a valid regulation of land use but an 'out-and-out plan of extor-
tion.'" 27  Framed in such terms, the debate would naturally shift
from whether to how much of a relationship would be required. 128
Applied to incentive zoning, however, Justice Scalia's reasoning pro-
duces nothing less than a radical reconception. To fully appreciate this
impact, it is helpful to recapitulate the paradigmatic incentive zoning
transaction. By universally accepted definition, incentive zoning posits
that the landowner voluntarily, as opposed to mandatorily, provides
the public amenity.' 29 Through express statutory language, the tech-
125. See, eg., Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899
(Utah 1981); Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Commu-
nity Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J.
1119, 1141-46 (1964). See generally Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Eco-
nomic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 passim (1977).
126. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839-40. Justice Scalia's "legitimate permitting require-
ments" presumably constitute related conditions. See id. at 834 n.2.
127. Id. at 837.
128. Compare Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3 ("substantial" standard) with id. at 843-
44 n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("reasonable" standard). The 20 state mandatory subdi-
vision exaction and impact fee cases which Justice Scalia cited run the gamut from loose
to tight relationship tests.
129. Commentators consistently refer to incentive zoning as "voluntary." See, e.g.,
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nique establishes two tiers of governmental regulation of private prop-
erty use. Landowners are entitled as a matter of right to a first tier
maximum zoning-defined density without obligation to provide ameni-
ties. At their option, landowners seek the incentive of exceeding that
maximum zoning-defined density, in return for their agreement to pro-
vide specified amenities. Government invents ex nihilo development
rights above the first tier and offers them strictly in its discretion.1 3
0
Landowners solicit such rights only if they envision a financial benefit
in the tradeoff between the incentive's value and the amenity's cost. 1
31
Private and public participants alike would agree that bonus develop-
ment rights do not belong to the landowner until the exchange is
consummated.
What makes incentive zoning voluntary, then, is that landowners
may remain at the first tier with no obligation to ascend to the second
tier and tender the desired public amenity. This touchstone of volun-
tary provision has made irrelevant the frequent resort to courts envel-
oping mandatory land use regulations of subdivision exactions, linkage,
and inclusionary zoning, each of which requires private developers to
2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 3D § 9.23, at 175 (3d ed. 1986); J.
GETZELS & M. JAFFE, supra note 1, at 14; 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, THE
LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 17.06(2), (3)(a) (4th ed. 1986); 5 N. WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 163.63, at 909 (1985); Alterman & Kayden, De-
veloper Provision of Public Benefits: Toward a Consensus Vocabulary, in PRIVATE SUP-
PLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES 25 (R. Alterman ed. 1988); Fox & Davis, Density Bonus
Zoning to Provide Low and Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015,
1028, 1036-65 (1976). Incentive zoning ordinances themselves make clear that land-
owners are not required to apply for floor area bonuses. In some instances, however, a
nominally voluntary ordinance may be empirically mandatory. For example, Boston's
housing linkage payment attaches only when office developers seek a "variance, condi-
tional use permit, exception or zoning map or text amendment .... " BOSTON, MASS.,
ZONING CODE art. 26A, § 26A-3, at 3 (1986). As a practical matter, however, develop-
ers argue that every project in Boston requires some discretionary action from the city
government in order to proceed, thereby converting a de jure voluntary contribution
into a de facto requirement. See Kayden & Pollard, supra note 100, at 130 n.17.
130. One way to conceptualize these rights is that they reside in a public develop-
ment rights bank, whose assets may be sold to individual property owners in return for
desired public amenities. Another way is to assume that the city decides to sell unused
air rights above publicly owned buildings and land. Public policy questions aside, it is
clear that private owners have no constitutional claim of right to these development
rights. Owners end up with larger buildings, the city with whatever amenities it wants,
a scenario essentially no different from what would occur if incentive zoning were used
for unrelated amenities.
131. See supra note 67 describing J. Kayden's "cost-plus" formula to calculate the
amount of incentive.
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provide public amenities before they can develop at all. 13 2 In any
event, prior to Nollan, 133 just compensation clause jurisprudence
would not have favored legal challenges from landowners involved in
incentive zoning transactions. As long as such owners retained a first
tier property use reasonable within the meaning of the clause, 134 then
the voluntary nature of an incentive zoning deal would a fortiori defeat
a traditional takings claim.
135
132. See, eg., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 94
Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (exactions), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Pioneer
Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961)
(exactions); Bonan v. General Hosp. Corp., No. 76438 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 31,
1986), (linkage) rev'd sub nom., Bonan v. City of Boston, 398 Mass. 315, 496 N.E.2d
640 (1986); Call v. City of W. Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (exactions); Board of
Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises, 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973) (inclusionary
zoning); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965)
(fees), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966). See also Bosselman & Stroud, Mandatory
Tithes: The Legality of Land Development Linkage, 9 NOVA L.J. 381 (1985); Connors
& High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions: From Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoBS. 69 (1987); Diamond, The San Francisco Office/Housing Program:
Social Policy Underwritten by Private Enterprise, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. R'V. 449 (1983);
Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981); Hey-
man & Gilhool, supra note 125, at 1119.
Unlike landowners who voluntarily participate in incentive zoning transactions, how-
ever, neighbors of bonused developments may have ample reason to fie suits. After all,
it is their light and air and sidewalks and streets which are impacted. See, e.g., Munici-
pal Art Soc'y v. City of New York, 137 Misc. 2d 832, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1987)
(look to "et al." named plaintiffs). Would they be able to file a just compensation clause
action against the transaction when their property rights are only indirectly affected?
See Kayden, Judges As Planners: Limited or General Partners?, in ZONING AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 250 n.160 (C. Haar & J. Kayden eds.
1989).
133. See Kayden, supra note 132, passim for a fuller discussion of Nollan and its
transformation of pre-existing just compensation clause jurisprudence.
134. Under the just compensation clause, property owners are normally entitled to
"economically viable use" of their property. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260 (1980). See eg., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124,
131 (1978). Thus, as long as the first tier use delivered economically viable use of prop-
erty, there could be no violation of the just compensation clause. See Montgomery
County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 376 A.2d 483 (1977) (rejecting
developer's argument that matter of right first tier zoning under incentive zoning was
too restrictive).
135. In a Massachusetts case, a developer voluntarily applied for and received spe-
cial permits to construct an additional 32 units of market rate housing in return for
eight units of low-income housing pursuant to the city's incentive zoning ordinance.
See Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 56, Iodice v. City of Newton, 397 Mass. 329, 491
N.E.2d 618 (1986) (No. 3908). He charged, inter alia, that the deal violated the just
compensation clause. Disregarding the value of the bonus market rate units, the devel-
oper alleged the tautology that his low-income units were unprofitable and therefore
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As applied, Justice Scalia's majority opinion stands for the proposi-
tion that the Constitution, as the Court interprets it, does not recognize
incentive zoning's paradigm of "voluntariness." By thinking about the
bonus development rights residing between the first and second tiers as
the owner's private property, instead of newly created rights, the opin-
ion vitiates the technique's operating presumption of owners who vol-
untarily provide amenities in return for such rights. In the end,
Nollan's constitutional right to the second tier overrules incentive zon-
ing's statutory right only to the first. This is not to say that developers
may now march into city hall and demand second tier development
rights without amenity obligation. But, by enmeshing private property
rights with governmental prerogatives, Nollan creates the constitu-
tional justification for overriding city hall's judgment about which le-
gitimate state interests it may promote. The Court invalidated a
government land use permit with conditions because the condition
(amenity) was unrelated to the burden which additional development
(incentive) imposed on a legitimate state interest. Thus, the Court
could similarly strike down exercises of incentive zoning for such unre-
lated amenities as low-income housing, theatres, and job training be-
cause, like the beach easement, such amenities do not serve the same
legitimate police power purposes as a refusal to grant the bonus floor
area incentive in the first place. 136 Specifically, such amenities fail to
deprived him of his constitutionally required economically viable use of property. The
court never reached this issue, resolving the case on procedural grounds.
In any event, the developer's claim should fail. He made the voluntary real estate
financial decision to supply eight units of low-income housing for 32 bonus market rate
units, plainly believing that he would be better off financially. The just compensation
clause does not guarantee a profit for speculative real estate investments. Moreover, the
correct focus for purposes of takings analysis is on the "parcel as a whole," i.e, his
entire residential development, and not just the eight low-income units. See Penn Cen-
tral Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
As an empirical matter, developers do extremely well in incentive zoning transac-
tions. See J. KAYDEN, supra note 7, at 59-65. This is understandable. Unlike a city's
decision to grant a bonus, which depends upon a complex balancing of public gains and
losses, the developer's decision to seek a bonus is based purely on a relatively straight-
forward calculus of dollars and cents.
136. Cf. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1614 n.63 (1988)
(contributions from landowners must address purposes of initial regulation). A New
York City bar association special committee interpreted Nollan to limit the use of incen-
tive zoning to related amenities. See The Special Committee on the Role of Amenities
in the Land Use Process, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Role
of Amenities in the Land Use Process 10-11 (1988).
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mitigate the negative impacts of congestion, light and air loss, and
overburdened capital infrastructure generated by bonus floor area.
B. Unconstitutional Conditions
A companion analytical framework for evaluating Justice Scalia's re-
lated amenities requirement springs from the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions.137 Under that doctrine, government generally may
not attach to benefits or permissions conditions that infringe upon con-
stitutional rights, even though government has no initial obligation to
grant such benefits or permissions. I38 A gloss on the doctrine is that
"germane" conditions, Le., conditions related to the benefit or permis-
sion, are preferred to non-germane conditions. 39 Thus, assuming that
the Commission had no obligation to grant permission to build the new
house in the first place, the Commission nonetheless could not condi-
tion such permission on the forfeiture of the just compensation clause
right to be free from government-authorized physical invasions, any
more than it could ask the Nollans to forego first amendment free
137. Several commentators have classified the Nollan case under the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine. See, e-g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-
4, at 598 n.18 (2d ed. 1988); Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term - Foreword:
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 60-64 (1988) (second best theory to one that returns police power to its "tradi-
tional confines"); Sullivan, supra note 123, at 1457 & n.180, 1463-64. Although one
article acknowledges that the case could be understood as broadly adopting the analysis
employed for review of subdivision exactions and impact fees, it affirmatively urges an
interpretation based on unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See Note, Municipal De-
velopment Exactions, The Rational Nexus Test, and the Federal Constitution, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 992, 998-1012 (1989).
138. See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583
(1926); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); see also Epstein, supra note 137, at 6-7;
Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321
(1935); Kreimer, supra note 123, at 1293; Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending
and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103 (1987); Sullivan, supra note 123, at 1427;
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
As the Court stated in Frost:
It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state,
having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it
sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and
one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relin-
quishment of constitutional rights.
271 U.S. at 593-94 (invalidating state's conditioning of highway usage on, inter alia,
carrier's agreement to common-carrier liability).
139. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 123, at 1350 & n.217.
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speech rights. On the other hand, Justice Scalia's "viewing spot," no
less- an "unconstitutional" physical invasion than the beach easement,
would survive as a condition germane to the Commission's declared
visual access goal.
Although Nollan is facially about a condition on a government per-
mit, and although Justice Scalia impressed a first amendment unconsti-
tutional conditions analogy,"4 the case does not unambiguously fit the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine mold.14 In particular, an uncon-
stitutional conditions analysis conflicts with Justice Scalia's property
rights approach because it posits that the owner has no entitlement
whatsoever to the new house, even as it demands germane conditions.
On the other hand, the property rights approach posits that the Nol-
lans enjoy a right to the new house, and thus may not be directly bur-
dened with obligations addressing harms to the public interest which
their development does not cause. Justice Scalia's express statement
that "the right to build on one's own property... cannot remotely be
described as a 'governmental benefit,'" and the implicit equation of the
right to build with the Nollans' right to the new house, instead suggest
an analysis deriving from direct burdens on constitutional rights rather
140. Analogizing the Commission's actions to a state law that "forbade shouting
fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100
to the state treasury," Justice Scalia observed that, while "requiring a $100 tax contribu-
tion in order to shout fire is a lesser restriction on speech than an outright ban, it would
not pass constitutional muster." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. For him, the $100 "shout
fire" treasury contribution condition would be unconstitutional because it (like the
beach easement) lacked any relationship to the underlying purpose served by the ban, to
wit, preventing panic in the theater (like preventing impairment of the Commission's
goal of preserving visual access to the coast).
This is a gossamer analogy. Would Justice Scalia truly be satisfied if the state
earmarked the money to an extra police detail to quell the panic or to a special fund to
recompense the trampled for their injuries? The constitutional standard for reviewing
regulation of speech is different than that employed for reviewing regulation of prop-
erty. Speech restrictions are subject to the highest level of judicial scrutiny. Property
restrictions, even post-Nollan, are subject to lesser scrutiny, although some might wish
it otherwise. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 263-82 (1985). Unlike the government's ubiquitous role in defin-
ing permissible property uses, the government's role in regulating speech is strictly lim-
ited to the margins. When government willingly allows an exception to the "shout fire"
ban, for a related or unrelated $100 contribution, it intrinsically demonstrates that the
ban itself is not strictly necessary. In contrast, while public goals furthered by a new
house ban are undercut when an exception allowing construction is granted, a more
lenient standard of constitutional review may tolerate a balancing of disparate public
interests. See infra note 159 discussing the Metromedia case.
141. The doctrine itself is fraught with analytical inconsistencies. See, e.g., Sullivan,
supra note 123, passim.
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than unconstitutional conditions.142 His citation of state subdivision
exaction and impact fee cases employing the direct burden analysis sus-
tains this view. Although Justice Scalia assumed for purposes of dis-
cussion that the Commission could have denied permission for the new
house altogether, that authority was itself limited by constitutional dic-
tates protecting underlying private property rights.143 Nollan surely
does not trigger unconstitutional conditions doctrine in its purest and
most intriguing form, where government has no constitutional obliga-
tion whatsoever to give permission or grant a benefit, such as National
Endowment for the Arts awards or housing tax credits, but is nonethe-
less prevented from attaching non-germane restrictions requiring relin-
quishment of constitutional rights. In the end, however, both the
property rights and unconstitutional conditions approaches would gen-
erally restrict government to requests for related (germane)
amenities. 144
142. In dissent, Justice Brennan did not read the Scalia majority as adopting an
unconstitutional conditions analysis. He noted:
The Court suggests that Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto. . . is distinguishable, because
government regulation of property in that case was a condition on receipt of a
"government benefit," while here regulation takes the form of a restriction on "the
right to build on one's own property," which "cannot remotely be described as a
government benefit."
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 860 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Monsanto, the company ar-
gued that FIFRA's contested provisions placed an unconstitutional condition on the
right to a valuable governmental benefit. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
998-99 (1984).
143. The Commission assumedly had authority to withhold permission, but only if
the house substantially impeded realization of the Commission's goals. Even then, how-
ever, the Commission would have to grant permission if "the denial would interfere so
drastically with the Nollans' use of their property as to constitute a taking." Nollan,
483 U.S. at 836. But see supra note 116 for a discussion of the "economic viability"
prong of the just compensation clause.
144. Attempts to distinguish between a "germaneness" requirement drawn from
unconstitutional conditions cases and a "relationship" requirement drawn from subdivi-
sion exaction and impact fee cases ultimately are beside the point. See Note, supra note
137, at 998-1000. Justice Scalia makes clear in Nollan that government may not ask
landowners to address problems which their own development does not create. His test
comes in two parts: (1) does the proposed development substantially impede promotion
of legitimate state interests justifying denial of the development; and (2) if so, then gov-
ernment may require the developer to mitigate the harm caused by the proposed devel-
opment. For the land use lawyer, this test broadly sounds just like the traditional
subdivision exaction test.
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C. The Nollan Facts and Incentive Zoning: A Way to Limit the
Rationale
While the Nollan rationale enervates the exercise of incentive zoning
for unrelated amenities, it would be rash to sound the death knell. The
reason is that, while the facts of the case superficially lend themselves
to the technique's argot, the Court did not squarely face a traditional
incentive zoning transaction. It is true that the Nollans sought to build
a house larger than that which the pertinent land use regulations au-
thorized as a matter of right.145 Further, the Commission wanted to
obtain beach access for the public. Just as a private developer applies
for a floor area bonus in return for providing a plaza or low-income
housing, the Nollans applied for a floor area bonus which the Commis-
sion would grant in exchange for the beach access amenity.1 46 This
linguistic characterization glosses over several points. To begin with,
the Court never explored or discussed the statutory matter of right use.
While the Nollans needed a development permit in order to replace the
existing bungalow with a new house,147 the Commission did not have
unbounded discretion to grant or deny the permit. 148 As long as their
proposed house met announced statutory criteria, the Nollans would
have received the permit. 149 On the basis of the available record, one
may therefore contend that the Nollans were statutorily entitled to
their new house.
More significantly, neither the Nollans nor the Commission con-
ceived or argued the case in the armature of incentive zoning. With
lawsuit as testament, the Nollans themselves would be the first to bri-
dle at any "voluntary" styling. 5 ° They were, after all, only asking to
145. For purposes of this discussion, the pertinent land use regulations are the state
laws controlling coastal development, not the underlying zoning of local jurisdictions.
See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30196, 30212, 30600 (West 1986).
146. The floor area of the new house (1,674 square feet) was more than three times
the floor area of the original bungalow (521 square feet).
147. While proceedings were pending before the California Court of Appeals, the
Nollans built their new house without notifying the Commission or acquiescing to its
demand for the beach easement deed restriction. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 830. This
makes for an interesting question about whether the Nollans effectively waived their
legal right to challenge the restriction, a question not fully considered by the Court in its
opinion.
148. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30196, 30212, 30600 (West 1986).
149. Id.
150. In any event, linguistic presentations alone are deceiving. Just as the Nollans'
interaction with the Commission can be described in incentive zoning's voluntary lan-
guage, commonplace incentive zoning transactions can be couched in "mandatory" ter-
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substitute a new home for an old one, not to develop a fifteen-unit con-
dominium project. The Commission never asserted in incentive zoning
terms that it was trading the new house for the unrelated amenity of
the beach easement.' Instead, it maintained that the beach easement
sufficiently related to the impact of the new house to pass constitu-
tional muster.
1 52
What, then, would the Court do if cleanly presented with incentive
zoning for unrelated amenities? The previously recounted "Tale of
Two Cities" presents a useful test case.153 In that Tale, it may be recal-
led, city planners and elected officials meet to establish zoning FARs
for the city's central business district. After reviewing governmental
fiscal requirements and traditional physical planning concerns, the offi-
cials set a base matter of right maximum zoning of fifteen FAR.154
Thus far, even Justice Scalia would concede that private property own-
ers are not constitutionally entitled to anything more than that level of
development, assuming the FAR restriction provides owners reason-
able use of their property within the meaning of the just compensation
clause. 155
As the meeting progresses, the planners make various incentive zon-
ing proposals. Under one, owners would receive three FAR floor area
bonuses for plazas and arcades. The planners justify this bonus on the
basis that the plazas and arcades would more than make up for delete-
rious impacts caused by the bonus floor space. Another proposal offers
minology. After all, in order to obtain the incentive of an FAR bonus, a developer is
forced to provide adjacent subway improvements. Words frequently reflect and convey
normative, rather than empirical, conceptions (penalty vs. nonsubsidy; right vs.
privilege).
151. Would there be anything wrong with the Commission deciding it is willing to
tolerate harm A (less visual access to the coast) in return for benefit B (more beach
access)? See supra text accompanying note 99.
152. Indeed, under the prevailing lenient standard of review prior to Nollan, the
Commission was probably correct. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 863 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[t]he State relied on the reasonable assumption that its action was justified under the
normal standard of review for determining legitimate exercises of a State's police
power."). The Court's myopic concentration on view blockage, only one of several
proffered Commission justifications, and not surprisingly the one with the least connec-
tion to the beach easement, largely predetermined the judicial outcome. See Kayden,
supra note 132, at 231-32.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93 explaining that traditional physical
planning concerns include street, sidewalk, mass transit, and sewer capacity, ground
light and air, and existing neighborhood character.
155. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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three FAR floor area bonuses for low-income housing, theatres, and
day care centers. Some planners oppose this proposal on the grounds
that the amenities fail to mitigate the incentive's negative physical im-
pacts. Others respond, however, that notwithstanding such impacts,
the city is on balance better off with these amenities. Following con-
tentious debate, the city adopts only the second incentive zoning pro-
posal. Thus, the city intentionally decides to accept greater congestion
and less light and air in order to obtain an alternate set of public
benefits.
Does the Constitution bar the city from making this choice? Two
principal objections come to mind. First, government will manipulate
the base matter of right zoning FAR to a lower level than otherwise
necessary in order to obtain amenities at no marginal physical planning
cost. Justice Scalia himself verbalized the danger of such manipulation
and, Rashomonlike, portrayed another vision of the Tale.' 5 6 In his
over-leveraged city, the planners and elected officials might set a base
FAR at an artificially low twelve rather than a planning-supported fif-
teen, and then offer three FAR bonuses in exchange for desired ameni-
ties. Alternatively, they might downzone a district's existing FAR
from fifteen to twelve, and then offer incentives for amenities that allow
developers to achieve the original fifteen. The sole reason for selecting
the twelve FAR in both cases would be to fire up incentive zoning's
economics without incurring the additional congestion, light and air,
and other physical planning costs incurred with FARs in excess of fif-
teen. The city would have its cake, a fifteen, rather than eighteen,
FAR central business district density, and eat it too, because develop-
ers would have provided desired amenities. At that point, the three
FAR would no longer constitute a true bonus, and the situation would
be no different than had the city zoned a fifteen FAR and directly bur-
dened owners with amenity requirements. Not only could Justice
Scalia express lofty concerns about a "lesser realization of the land use
goals" served by the "more lenient (but nontradeable) development re-
156. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 n.5. Justice Scalia stated:
One would expect that a regime in which this kind of leveraging of the police
power is allowed would produce stringent land-use regulations which the State then
waives to accomplish other purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use
goals purportedly sought to be served that would result from more lenient (but
nontradeable) development restrictions. Thus, the importance of the purpose un-
derlying the prohibition not only does not justify the imposition of unrelated condi-
tions for eliminating the prohibition, but positively militates against the practice.
Id. (emphasis partially in original and partially added).
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strictions" of the fifteen FAR, but, more significantly, he could cor-
rectly assert that property rights had been unconstitutionally
appropriated. 5 7 Although Justice Scalia is correct as to the real world
possibility of the over-leveraged city, his scenario does not rise to the
level of a judicially noticeable fact justifying a blanket conclusion about
whose property rights are at stake. Justice Scalia sounds a bit like a
character from another Dickens story, the Ghost of Christmas Future,
warning about things that might but do not have to be. Ever vigilant
to the over-leveraged city scenario, courts can and should sift the evi-
dence to assure that incentive zoning ordinances feature real
incentives.15"
The second objection is that government's willingness to sacrifice
physical planning goals served by the base FAR regulation demon-
strates a lack of seriousness about such goals. If such goals are expend-
able, goes the argument, then so is the base regulation. In a world of
scarce resources, however, cities routinely decide to advance one public
interest over another, even though each interest may be important.
Governing is centrally about choices from a basketful of apples and
oranges. When a city openly, seriously, and intentionally chooses a
mixture of more low-income housing and more congestion over a mix-
ture of less congestion and less low-income housing, then that city has
engaged in routine decision-making. Nothing in the just compensation
clause elevates the goals underlying the base regulation to a more sa-
cred position than the goals underlying the unrelated amenities. 5 9 In-
157. This analysis assumes that the city would have no constitutional justification
for imposing the amenity requirements on existing property uses, and that low-income
housing, theatres, and day care centers are indeed unrelated amenities.
158. The burden should be on the property owner to prove the over-leveraged city,
not on the city to prove real incentive zoning. In any event, FARs are indicative, not
scientifically precise, figures. As with all government regulation, or, for that matter,
constitutional adjudication, the drawing of lines has its arbitrary side.
159. The issue of alternative public goals arises in other constitutional contexts as
well. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), for example, the
city's billboard ban exempted on-premise business identification signs. Id. at 493.
Although such signs obviously undercut the city's traffic safety and aesthetics goals
underlying the general ban, they promoted an alternative goal of convenience to the
public. Id. at 512. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan observed that "a city can
have special goals the accomplishment of which would conflict with the overall goals
addressed by the total billboard ban." Id. at 532 n.10. (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Brennan reasoned that "[i]t would make little sense to say that a city
has an all-or-nothing proposition - either ban all billboards or none at all." Id. In the
first amendment commercial speech context, Justice Brennan would have applied the
following test to approve an exception:
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terestingly, a ban on unrelated amenities interferes not only with the
preferences of city mothers and fathers, but potentially with those of
property owners as well. 1" Given the choice between the "unrelated"
beach easement and the "related" viewing spot, for example, the Nol-
lans might very well have selected the beach easement. In the typical
incentive zoning transaction, the developer's choice between related
and unrelated amenities would reduce to an economic calculus in
which developers, in return- for a bonus, would prefer to provide an
inexpensive unrelated amenity rather than an expensive related one.
Any constitutional assessment of incentive zoning under the just
compensation clause ultimately falls prey to the circularity of private
property rights definitions." Determination of rights depends on the
level of government regulation, and the level of government regulation
depends on avoiding improper infringement of private property rights.
The idea that owners are constitutionally entitled to use their property
as they see fit, but subject to government regulation promoting the
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its citizens, yields scant
insight. Incentive zoning plays in the twilight of this guarantee, mixing
two scenarios of the public interest with two levels of private property
rights. The fundamental purpose of the just compensation clause, to
ensure that individuals do not bear burdens more properly borne by
society at large, proves equally unhelpful. Contingent upon one's as-
sessment of who owns property rights nominally created by incentive
zoning, the technique either does or does not impose such burdens
when it attempts to encourage unrelated amenities.
Justice Scalia proffers no convincing theory to justify constitutional
attribution of the bonus rights to the owner. Moreover, Nollan itself
does not involve a classic incentive zoning transaction. Consequently,
Justice Scalia's opinion represents a weak basis upon which to upset
[I]f a city can justify a total ban, I would allow an exception only if it directly
furthers an interest that is at least as important as the interest underlying the total
ban, if the exception is no broader than necessary to advance the special goal, and if
the exception is narrowly drawn so as to impinge as little as possible on the overall
goal. To the extent that exceptions rely on content-based distinctions, they must be
scrutinized with special care.
Id.
160. Economists have criticized Nollan for prohibiting mutually satisfactory bar-
gains. See, e.g., Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 1581, 1588 (1988).
161. See C. HAAR & J. KAYDEN, LANDMARK JUSTICE: THE INFLUENCE OF WIL-
LIAM J. BRENNAN ON AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES 194-95 (1989).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol39/iss1/2
ZONING FOR DOLLARS
widespread acceptance by local governments and private developers of
the technique. As long as Justice Scalia's over-leveraged world remains
a case-by-case proposition, the technique does not deny landowners
rights which should be ascribed to them. In the end, the result in Nol-
Ian is most understandable when described as a case about a family
wanting to replace an old house with a new one. The five members of
the Court majority thought this "right" to the new house could not be
encumbered with obligations having nothing to do with the new house.
Extending that proposition to the barter world of incentive zoning
would likely surprise some, if not all, members of Justice Scalia's ma-
jority as much as it would surprise regular practitioners of the
technique.
IV. THE NEED FOR RULES FOR UNRELATED AMENITIES
The constitutional acceptance of incentive zoning for unrelated
amenities should not obscure the technique's potential shortcomings
and the resulting importance of policy guidelines. Questions of who
gains and who loses demand explicit and rigorous examination, espe-
cially as the disconnection between an incentive's burden and an amen-
ity's benefit increases. In order to make informed judgments about
whether to support or oppose the tradeoff between congestion here and
low-income housing there, citizens need full disclosure about the na-
ture of the bargain.1
62
Furthermore, incentive zoning, no less than land policy at all levels
of government, should strive toward ideals of fairness and equity in its
162. It is not certain, however, that sunshine and resulting greater participation by
the public will inevitably result in better or more equitable decisions. See generally
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1067-73 (1980) (arguing
that smaller responsive units best promote public participation in government decision-
making, that such participation is good, but that "the argument for city power rests on
what cities have been and what they could become," rather than what they are). Local
governments may be captive of majorities or powerful neighborhood groups that refuse
incentive zoning's cost of greater development for its benefit of unrelated amenities such
as low-income housing. See Fischel, supra note 160, at 1582. Not surprisingly, incen-
tive zoning's array of amenities and incentives have generally been clustered in high-
income areas containing office buildings and market-rate housing, not in low-income
neighborhoods. Furthermore, discussions in the sunshine sometimes encourage polit-
ical rhetoric masking difficult choices. For example, when discussions of health and
safety regulations quantitatively assign life and death rates to specific levels of regula-
tion, elected officials understandably treat the issue as political dynamite. In a similar
fashion, one wonders whether closer public scrutiny of the tradeoff between an intermit-
tent shadow over Central Park and the extra public services provided from the addi-
tional revenue of a larger building would result in a more equitable or efficient decision.
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administration. Incentive zoning's burdens and benefits should be
evenly distributed throughout a city in accordance with zoning's bed-
rock principle of according equal and uniform treatment to similarly
situated landowners. 163 No single area should bear a disproportionate
share of bonus floor area, nor enjoy a disproportionate share of ameni-
ties. Rough equality would assure what Justice Holmes, in a different
context, called the "average reciprocity of advantage," a catch-all con-
cept fundamental to the legality and acceptance of all government re-
strictions on private property. 164 This concept, however, is not a call
for exact equality. Just as commonplace zoning regulations or historic
preservation laws routinely saddle one landowner or one area with bur-
dens not shared by everyone else, 161 incentive zoning will similarly bur-
den some more than others.
The technique's administration may profit from government experi-
ence garnered in the NIMBY 166 and LULU16 7 era, in which local plan-
ners strategically disperse throughout a city problematic, yet needed,
land uses such as drug treatment centers, homeless shelters, and
jails.'68 Similarly, state governments have undertaken to apportion
such unpopular uses as hazardous waste treatment plants and prisons
among different towns, and even have offered compensating public ben-
efits of additional state aid, which some describe as bribes, in order to
encourage local acceptance. 169 The purpose of these efforts is to assure
individuals and neighborhoods that they are being treated fairly when
government distributes benefits and burdens.
163. See, eg., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 40A, § 4 (West 1983).
164. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see also Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (purpose of just compensation clause is
to assure that government is not "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
165. See, eg., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134-35
(1978).
166. NIMBY stands for "not in my back yard."
167. LULU stands for "locally undesirable land uses."
168. See, e.g., M. O'HARE, L. BAcow & D. SANDERSON, FACILITY SrTING AND
PUBLIC OPPOSITION passim (1983).
169. See, eg., INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATION, NOT-IN-MY-
BACKYARD: COMMUNrrY REACTION TO LOCALLY UNWANTED LAND USE 3 (1984);
Mitchell & Carson, Property Rights, Protest, and the Siting of Hazardous Waste Facili-
ties, 76 AEA PAPERs AND PROC. 285 (1988).
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V. CONCLUSION
In usual circumstances, incentive zoning and courtrooms are stran-
gers. The two principals, private developer and government, see the
technique through spectacles of self-interest. Under utilitarian calcula-
tions, the private developer seeks to maximize the amount of develop-
ment on a fixed quantity of land and enters an incentive zoning deal if
the value of additional building rights exceeds the amenity's cost. Con-
fronting decreased federal support and louder cries for social services,
local governments view incentive zoning as an off-budget mechanism
to meet public needs. As long as the "over-leveraged" city remains
largely fictional, both principals will continue to support this exercise
of zoning authority. In one respect, the Municipal Art Society 170 and
Nollan cases confirm this reality. The central plaintiff in Municipal Art
Society was not a private developer but a civic-minded neighbor desir-
ing to protect the public's right to light and air. In Nollan, although
the plaintiffs were the affected landowners, neither the plaintiff owners
nor the defendant government would likely characterize the beach
easement as voluntary in any "incentive zoning" sense. Nonetheless,
both cases have the potential for chilling the technique's use.
This article has analyzed the facts and reasoning of the two opinions,
finding that both expressly or impliedly demand that amenities relate
to the impact of incentives. Moreover, the article has highlighted ana-
lytical weaknesses leading to this conclusion and urged that neither
opinion serve as the basis for invalidating this practice. Although ex-
changing bonuses for unrelated amenities might offend good planning
theory and practice, a constitutional objection is unfounded. Accord-
ingly, ameliorative public policies addressing the pitfalls remain the
preferable approach.
170. Since Justice Lehner's decision in 1987, the Columbus Circle project has
changed its scope several times. In 1988, the city and developer agreed to a smaller
project with a corresponding reduction in land price from $455 million to $357 million.
See N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1989, BI, col. 4. In 1989, the developer and city downsized
further, and the land price further dropped to $337 million. Id. Although the Munici-
pal Art Society agreed to this compromise, other parties have brought additional law-
suits. Id. At the time of this article, the project is still in limbo.
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